After a very long delay, in December 1869 the case came before Mr Prentice to ascertain, as I have said, whether the bills were delivered to Mr Bradlaugh in England or in France. Once more Mr Bradlaugh presented himself as a witness, to prove their delivery to him in England, and once more, despite the passing of the Evidence Amendment Act in the previous August, his evidence was objected to. Mr Bradlaugh appeared in person, and Mr Wood, who had been counsel for the defendant at the hearing before Mr Justice Lush, again appeared for him. On Mr Bradlaugh tendering himself as witness, Mr Wood--who, like his predecessor Mr Keane, said that, acting under special instructions, he took a course which gave him considerable pain--asked him: "Do you believe in God?" Mr Bradlaugh's objection to answer this question was followed by a long discussion, at the end of which Mr Prentice held that he was bound to answer. Again Mr Wood put the question: "Do you believe in God?" Mr Bradlaugh: "I do not; that is, I do not believe in any being independent of the universe, governing or ruling it." Mr Prentice: "Do you believe in a future state of rewards and punishments?" Mr Bradlaugh: "After death, certainly not." "Then," said Mr Prentice, "I must refuse your evidence." A day or so later my father, undaunted, carried his case before Mr Justice Brett at Judges' Chambers, and asked for an order to compel Mr Prentice to take his evidence; but Mr Justice Brett held, although with some doubt, that Mr Prentice was not authorised by the Act of Parliament to administer the alternative declaration.[126] The Judge added that Mr Bradlaugh ought to have liberty to apply to the Court against the decision, and endorsed his judgment with the opinion that it was "a fit case to go before the full court." [Footnote 126: The Evidence Amendment Act 1869 (32 and 33 Vict. c. 68) enacted "that if any person called to give evidence in any court, whether in a civil or criminal proceeding, shall object to take an oath, or shall be objected to as incompetent to take an oath, such person shall, if the presiding judge is satisfied that the taking of the oath would have no binding effect upon his conscience, make the promise and declaration the form of which is contained in the same section." Mr Prentice, as arbitrator, did not consider himself a "presiding judge" within the meaning of the Act, and was not therefore qualified to satisfy himself as to the state of a witness's conscience.]