Charles Bradlaugh: a Record of His Life and Work, Volume 2 (of 2): With an Account of his Parliamentary Struggle, Politics and Teachings. Seventh EditionRobertson, J. M. (John Mackinnon)
Religion
Charles Bradlaugh: a Record of His Life and Work, Volume 2 (of 2): With an Account of his Parliamentary Struggle, Politics and Teachings. Seventh Edition
Robertson, J. M. (John Mackinnon)
Bradlaugh, Charles, 1833-1891
The one technical weakness of the case was that nowhere had the
legislature explicitly said that persons with no religious belief
should be free to make affirmation of allegiance; though to found on
this omission would be to assume that the legislature, while thinking
the oath could advantageously (for that was avowed in the preambles)
be dispensed with in the taking of evidence, thought it could not be
dispensed with in the formality preceding entrance into Parliament.
On that point, however, Mr Justice Mathew founded his judgement,
which was delivered on 11th March. The Evidence Acts, he decided,
were clearly "intended to remove restrictions upon the admissibility
of witnesses with a view of promoting the discovery of the truth,"
and "had no other object." The Acts of 1866 and 1869-70 must not
be read together, because the legislature could not be supposed to
have "intended" them to be so read. To this argument--one of the two
mutually exclusive methods of interpretation of law which judges employ
at their choice--Mr Justice Mathew added a pointed comment on one
of the defendant's arguments. Bradlaugh, he said, had "attempted to
show that the privilege of sitting in either House of Parliament was
analogous to the 'privilege' of giving evidence in a court of justice."
On which his lordship absurdly remarked that "no one who was free to
choose his words and had a preference for accuracy of expression would
speak of the discharge of the all-important and anxious duty of a
witness as a privilege." It plainly follows on this, either that the
work of a member of Parliament is _not_ an "all-important and anxious
duty," or that it is not a privilege. The first alternative is absurd;
the other quashes the judge's argument. Further, it is the historical
fact that Bradlaugh and other Freethinkers _had_ regarded the power of
giving evidence in court as a privilege, and had so described it. It
may suffice to give these grounds, for the view of many of us is that
the decision was unjust. But neither at this nor at any other time was
Bradlaugh known even in private to question a judge's fairness. His
loyalty to the established system of "justice" was absolute.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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