2. Under the statutes of Maryland, now the law of the District, the Governor, and, of course, the President, may remit "the whole or any part of any fine," without exception. 3. Under the Constitution of the United States, and according to its true spirit, the pardoning power of the President is coextensive with the power to punish, except in the solitary case of impeachment. * * * * * Several courses are open to the President in the present case. I. By a _general pardon_ he may discharge Drayton and Sayres _from prison, and remit all the fines and costs for which they are detained_. Such a pardon would unquestionably operate effectually upon the imprisonment and upon the costs, and also upon the half of the fines due to the county. It would be for the courts, on a proper application, and in the exercise of their just powers, to restrict it, if the pardon did not operate upon the other moiety. Among the opinions of the Attorney-General is a case which illustrates this point. In 1824 Joshua Wingate prayed for a credit, in the settlement of his accounts, for his proportion of a fine incurred by one Phineas Varney. It appeared that suit was instituted by the petitioner as Collector of the District of Bath, Maine, on which judgment was obtained in May, 1809; the defendant was arrested and committed to jail, under execution on that judgment, and the fine was afterwards remitted by the President. The petitioner contended that the President had no constitutional or legal power to remit his proportion of the fine, the right to which had vested by the institution of the suit. On this Mr. Wirt remarks, that "it is unnecessary to express an opinion upon the correctness of this position, because, if it be correct, the act of remission by the President being wholly inoperative as to that portion of the fine claimed by the collector, his legal right to recover it remained in full force, notwithstanding the remission; and it is his own fault, if he has not enforced his right at law." (Opinions of the Attorneys-General, Vol. I. p. 479.) A general pardon cannot conclude the question so as to divest any existing rights. It can do no wrong. Why should the President hesitate to exercise it? II. By a _limited pardon_ the President may discharge Drayton and Sayres simply and exclusively _from their imprisonment, without touching their pecuniary liability_, but leaving them still exposed to proceedings for all fines and costs, to be satisfied out of any property they may hereafter acquire.