"If the opinion of the Supreme Court cover the whole ground of this Act, it ought not to control the coördinate authorities of this Government. The Congress, the Executive, and the Court must each for itself be guided by its own opinion of the Constitution. _Each public officer who takes an oath to support the Constitution swears that he will support it_ _as he understands it, and not as it is understood by others._ It is as much the duty of the House of Representatives, of the Senate, and of the President, to decide upon the constitutionality of any bill or resolution which may be presented to them for passage or approval, as it is of the Supreme Judges, when it may be brought before them for judicial decision.... The authority of the Supreme Court must not, therefore, be permitted to control the Congress or the Executive, when acting in their legislative capacities, but to have only such influence as the force of their reasoning may deserve."[167] [167] Senate Journal, 22d Cong. 1st Sess., pp. 438, 439. With these authoritative words I dismiss this topic. The early legislation of Congress and the decisions of the Supreme Court cannot stand in our way. I advance to the argument. * * * * * (1.) _First, of the power of Congress over this subject._ The Constitution contains _powers_ granted to Congress, _compacts_ between the States, and _prohibitions_ addressed to the Nation and to the States. A compact or prohibition may be accompanied by a power,--but not necessarily, for it is essentially distinct in nature. And here the single question arises, Whether the Constitution, by grant, general or special, confers upon Congress any _power_ to legislate on the subject of fugitives from service. The whole legislative power of Congress is derived from two distinct sources: first, from the general grant, attached to the long catalogue of powers, "to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof"; and, secondly, from special grants in other parts of the Constitution. As the provision in question does not appear in the catalogue of powers, and does not purport to vest any power in the Government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof, no power to legislate on this subject can be derived from the general grant. Nor can any such power be derived from any special grant in any other part of the Constitution; for none such exists. The conclusion must be, that no power is delegated to Congress over the surrender of fugitives from service.