the Abolition Society of Maryland, with the prefatory observation, that, "in the case of slaves escaping from their masters, the friends of universal liberty are often embarrassed in their conduct by a conflict between their principles and _the obligations imposed by unwise and perhaps unconstitutional laws_." [205] Blackstone, Commentaries, Vol. II. p. 94. Briefly, the States are prohibited from any "law or regulation" by which any "person" escaped from "service or labor" may be discharged therefrom, and on establishment of the claim to such "service or labor" he is to be "delivered up." But the mode by which the claim shall be tried and determined is not specified. All this is obviously within the control of each State. It may be by virtue of express legislation; in which event, any Legislature, justly careful of Personal Liberty, would surround the fugitive with every shield of Law and Constitution. But here a fact pregnant with Freedom must be studiously observed. The name _Slave_--that litany of wrong and woe--does not appear in the clause. Here is no unambiguous phrase, incapable of a double sense,--no "positive" language, applicable only to slaves, and excluding all other classes,--no word of that absolute certainty in every particular which forbids any interpretation except that of Slavery, and makes it impossible "to catch at anything in favor of Liberty." Nothing of this kind is here. But, passing from this,--"impiously and cruelly" renouncing for the moment all leanings for Freedom,--refusing "to catch at anything in favor of Liberty,"--abandoning the cherished idea of the Fathers, that it was "_wrong_ to admit in the Constitution the idea that there could be property in men,"--and, in the face of these commanding principles, assuming two things,--first, that, in the evasive language of this clause, the Convention, whatever may have been the aim of individual members, really intended fugitive slaves, which is sometimes questioned, and, secondly, that, if they so intended, the language employed can be judicially regarded as justly applicable to fugitive slaves, which is often and earnestly denied,--then the whole proceeding, without any express legislation, may be left to ancient and authentic forms of the Common Law, familiar to the framers of the Constitution, and ample for the occasion. If the fugitive be seized without process, he will be entitled at once to his writ _de Homine Replegiando_, while the master, resorting to process, may find his remedy in the writ _de Nativo Habendo_, each requiring trial by jury. If, from ignorance or lack of employment, these processes have slumbered in our country, still they belong to the great arsenal of the Common Law, and continue, like other ancient writs, _tanquam gladius in vagina_, ready to be employed at the first necessity. They belong to the safeguards of the citizen. But in any event, and in either