Now I will not occupy your time, nor am I so disposed at this moment, nor does the occasion require it, by entering upon any minute criticism of the clause in the Constitution touching the surrender of "fugitives from service." A few words only are needful. Assuming, Sir, in the face of commanding rules of interpretation, all leaning towards Freedom, that, in the evasive language of this clause, "paltering in a double sense," the words employed can be judicially regarded as justly applicable to fugitive slaves, which, as you ought to know, Sir, is often most strenuously and conscientiously denied, thus sponging the whole clause out of existence, except as a provision for the return of persons actually bound by lawful contract, but on which I now express no opinion,--assuming, I say, this interpretation, so hostile to Freedom, and derogatory to the members of the National Convention, who solemnly declared that they would not give any sanction to Slavery, or admit in the Constitution the idea that there could be property in men,--assuming, I repeat, an interpretation which every principle of the Common Law, claimed by our fathers as their birthright, must disown,--admitting, for the moment only, that the Constitution of the United States has any words which in any legal intendment can constrain fugitive slaves,--then I desire to say, that, as I understand the Constitution, this clause does not impose upon me, as Senator or citizen, any obligation to take part, directly or indirectly, in the surrender of a fugitive slave.