When the veteran Senator of Virginia has answered this objection, when he is able to find in the Constitution a power which is not to be found, and to make us see what is not to be seen, then let him answer another objection. The Constitution has secured the inestimable right of Trial by Jury "in suits at Common Law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars." Of course Freedom is not susceptible of pecuniary valuation; therefore there can be no question that the claim for a fugitive slave is within this condition. In determining what is meant by "suits at Common Law," recourse must be had to the Common Law itself, precisely as we resort to that law in order to determine what is meant by "Trial by Jury." Let the Senator, if he be a lawyer, undertake to show that a claim for a fugitive slave is not, according to early precedents and writs,--well known to the framers of the Constitution, especially to Charles Cotesworth Pinckney and John Rutledge, of South Carolina, both of whom had studied law at the Temple,--a _suit at Common Law_, to which, under the solemn guaranty of the Constitution, is attached the Trial by Jury, as an inseparable incident. Let the Senator show this, if he can. And, Sir, when the veteran Senator has found a power in the Constitution where none exists, and has set aside the right of Trial by Jury in a suit at Common Law, then let him answer yet another objection. By the judgment of the Supreme Court of the United States, a claim for a fugitive slave is declared to be _a case under the Constitution_,[130] within the judicial power; and this judgment of the Court is confirmed by common sense and Common Law. Let the Senator show, if he can, how such exalted exercise of judicial power can be confided to a single petty magistrate, appointed, not by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, but by the Court,--holding his office, not during good behavior, but merely during the will of the Court,--and receiving, not a regular salary, but fees according to each individual case. Let the Senator answer this objection, if, in any way, by twist of learning, logic, or law, he can. [130] Prigg _v._ Pennsylvania, 16 Peters, 616. Thus, Sir, do I present the issue directly on this monstrous enactment. Let the author of the Fugitive Slave Bill meet it. He will find me ready to follow him in argument,--though I trust never to be led, even by his example, into any departure from those courtesies of debate which are essential to the harmony of every legislative body. * * * * *