Congress, in abstaining from all exercise of power under the first clause, when required to protect the liberty of colored citizens, while assuming power under the second clause, in order to obtain the surrender of fugitive slaves, shows an inconsistency, which becomes more monstrous when it is considered that in the one case the general and commanding interests of Liberty are neglected, while in the other the peculiar and subordinate interests of Slavery are carefully assured; and such an exercise of power is an alarming evidence of that influence of Slavery in the National Government which has increased, is increasing, and ought to be overthrown. Looking more precisely at these two clauses, we arrive at the true conclusion. According to express words of the Constitution, in the Tenth Amendment, "the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people"; and since no powers are delegated to the United States in the clause relating to "privileges and immunities of citizens," or in the associate clause of the same section, relating to the surrender of "persons held to service or labor," therefore all legislation by Congress, under either clause, must be an assumption of undelegated powers, and an infraction of rights secured to the States respectively, or to the people: and such, I have already said, is the Fugitive Slave Act. I might go further, and, by the example of South Carolina, vindicate to Massachusetts, and every other State, the right to put such interpretation upon the "fugitive" clause as it shall think proper. The Legislature of South Carolina, in a series of resolutions adopted in 1844, asserts the following proposition:-- "_Resolved_, That free negroes and persons of color are not citizens of the United States _within the meaning of the Constitution_, which confers upon the citizens of one State the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States."[173] [173] Reports and Resolutions of the General Assembly of South Carolina, Sess. 1844, December 5, p. 160. Here is a distinct assumption of right to determine the _persons_ to whom certain words of the Constitution are applicable. Now nothing can be clearer than this: If South Carolina may determine for itself whether the clause relating to the "privileges and immunities of citizens" be applicable to _colored citizens_ of the several States, and may solemnly deny its applicability, then may Massachusetts, and every other State, determine for itself whether the other clause, relating to the surrender of "persons held to service or labor," be really applicable to _fugitive slaves_, and may solemnly deny its applicability.