_First._ The compromise between the small States and large States can be made completely effective, according to obvious intent of the authors of the Constitution, only by interdicting the Senate from originating the great appropriation bills. If this interdict is restricted simply to tariff bills, which occur only at rare intervals, it becomes a very inadequate compensation for the surrender by the large States to the small States in the constitution of the Senate. According to the reason of the rule, the great appropriation bills must be equally within its intendment. The reason is as strong in one case as in the other. In the debates of the Convention, Dr. Franklin said:-- “As it had been asked what would be the use of restraining the second branch from meddling with _money bills_, he could not but remark, that it was always of importance that the people should know who had disposed of their money, _and how it had been disposed of_.” Please, Sir, to mark these words. “It was a maxim, that those who feel can best judge. This end would, he thought, be best attained, if _money affairs_ were to be confined to the immediate representatives of the people.”[37] Mr. Gerry, in urging the restraint upon the Senate, said:-- “The other branch was more immediately the representatives of the people, _and it was a maxim that the people ought to hold the purse-strings_.”[38] How, Sir, can the people hold the purse-strings, unless they hold the bills by which the purse is appropriated? And Colonel Mason broke forth in language clearly revealing his sense of danger against which to guard. “If the Senate can originate, they will, in the recess of the legislative sessions, hatch their mischievous projects for their own purposes, and have their _money bills_ cut and dried (to use a common phrase) for the meeting of the House of Representatives.”[39] I repeat, then, according to the reason of the rule, the great appropriation bills must be embraced by the prohibition. _Secondly._ There is a further consideration, founded on the familiar use of the term _money bills_ throughout the debates in the Convention, as applicable to bills which the Senate cannot originate. I need not occupy time by reference to instances; but whoever takes the trouble to investigate the matter in Mr. Madison’s report of the debates, and also in the report of the Virginia Convention, will find that this term is universally employed,--unless, indeed, where Mr. Gouverneur Morris uses the broader term “money plans,”[40] and Mr. Gerry “money matters.”[41] Now all these phrases are clearly applicable to “appropriation bills,” by which the Government is carried on; and the inference seems irresistible, that the parties who used them must have had such bills in mind.