And here we are brought to the practical question destined to occupy so much of public attention. It is proposed to bring the action of Congress to bear directly upon the Rebel States. This may be by the establishment of provisional governments under authority of Congress, or simply by making the admission or recognition of the States depend upon the action of Congress. The essential feature of the proposition is, _that Congress shall assume jurisdiction of the Rebel States_. A bill authorizing provisional governments in these States was introduced into the Senate by Mr. Harris, of the State of New York, and was afterwards reported from the Judiciary Committee of that body; but it was left with unfinished business, when the late Congress expired on the fourth of March. The opposition to this proposition, so far as I understand it, assumes two forms: first, that these States are always to be regarded as States, with much vaunted State Rights, and therefore cannot be governed by Congress; and, secondly, that, if any government is to be established over them, it must be simply a military government, with a military governor appointed by the President, as is the case with Tennessee and North Carolina. But State Rights are as much disturbed by a military government as by a Congressional government. The local government is as much set aside in one case as in the other. If the President, within State limits, can proceed to organize a military government to exercise all the powers of the State, surely Congress can proceed to organize a civil government within the same limits for the same purpose; nor can any pretension of State Rights be effective against Congress more than against President. Indeed, the power belongs to Congress by a higher title than it belongs to President: first, because a civil government is more in harmony with our institutions, and, wherever possible, is required; and, secondly, because there are provisions of the Constitution under which this power is clearly derived. Assuming, then, that the pretension of State Rights is as valid against one form of government as against the other, and still further assuming, that, in the case of military governments, this pretension is practically overruled by the President at least, we are brought again to consider its efficacy when advanced against Congressional governments. It is argued, that the Acts of Secession are all inoperative and void, and therefore the States continue precisely as before, with their local constitutions, laws, and institutions in the hands of traitors, but totally unchanged, and ready to be quickened into life by returning loyalty. Such, I believe, is a candid statement of the pretension for State Rights against Congressional governments, which, it is argued, cannot be substituted for the State governments.