Charles Sumner: his complete works, volume 10 (of 20)Sumner, Charles
History
Charles Sumner: his complete works, volume 10 (of 20)
Sumner, Charles
Slavery -- United States; Speeches, addresses, etc., American
The clause begins with the descriptive words, “No _person_ held to
service or labor in one State under the laws thereof.” Now a slave
is not a “person,” with the rights of persons, but a _chattel_ or
_thing_. Such is the received definition of the Slave States, handed
down from Aristotle. He is not “held to service or labor,” but he is
held as property. The terms employed describe an apprentice, but not
a slave. And he must be held “under the laws” of a State. Here again
is the case of an apprentice, who is clearly held “under the laws”
of a State. But we have the authority of Mr. Mason, recently of the
Senate from Virginia, for saying that no proof can be produced that
Slavery in any State “is established by _existing laws_.”[325] The
person thus described shall not “be _discharged_ from such service or
labor.” Clearly an apprentice is discharged, but a slave is manumitted
or emancipated. This undischarged person “shall be delivered up on
_claim_ of the party to whom such service or labor may be _due_.” But
all these words imply _contract_, or at least _debt_, as in the case of
an apprentice. The slave can _owe_ no “service or labor” to his master.
There is nothing in their relations out of which any such obligation
can spring. The whole condition stands on force and nothing else. It is
robbery tempered by the lash,--not merely robbery of all the fruits of
industry, but robbery of wife and child. To such terrible assumption
the language of _contract_ or _debt_ is totally inapplicable. Nothing
can be “due” from slave to master, unless it be that “resistance to
tyrants” which is “obedience to God.” It is absurd to say that “labor
or service,” in any sense, whether of justice or of law, can be “due”
from the slave. The same power which takes wife and child may exact
this further sacrifice, but not because it is “due.”
Such is the simple truth touching this much debated clause. At the
touchstone of unquestioned rules of interpretation its _odious_
character disappears, and astonishment prevails that the public mind
for so long a period could have been perverted with regard to its true
meaning. Nobody can doubt that this clause _may_ be interpreted in
favor of Freedom, so as to exclude all idea of property in man. But if
it _may_, then such is the voice of Freedom that it _must_.
APPLICABLE TO INDENTED SERVANTS.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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