“I have always thought that the Constitution addressed itself to the Legislatures of the States, or to the States themselves. It says that those persons escaping to other States ‘shall be delivered up,’ and I confess I have always been of the opinion that it was an injunction upon the States themselves. When it is said that a person escaping into another State, and coming, therefore, within the jurisdiction of that State, shall be delivered up, _it seems to me the import of the clause is, that the State itself, in obedience to the Constitution, shall cause him to be delivered up_. _That is my judgment. I have always entertained that opinion, and I entertain it now._”[356] “I have always entertained that opinion, and I entertain it now.” Such are the emphatic words by which Mr. Webster declares his judgment of the unconstitutionality of this Act. He was not alone. Mr. Mason, the actual author of the Act of Congress, exposed its unconstitutionality in the very speech by which he introduced it. “In my reading of these clauses of the Constitution for extradition of fugitives of both classes, _I advance the confident opinion_ that it devolves upon the States the duty of providing by law both for their capture and delivery.… I say, then, Sir, that the true intent of the Constitution was to devolve it upon the States, as a federal duty, to enforce, by their own laws, within their respective limits, both these clauses of extradition.”[357] And Mr. Butler, of South Carolina, at a later day, said:-- “Under the Constitution, each State of itself ought to provide for the rendition of all fugitives from labor to their masters. _This was certainly the design of the Constitution._”[358] Such are some of the authorities, judicial and political, by which Congressional power over this subject is denied. And yet, in the face of all authority, and in defiance of reason, Congress assumed this power. It was done at the demand of Slavery, and for the protection of Slavery. Of course, such an assumption of undelegated power was a usurpation at the time, and is a usurpation still,--doubly hateful, when it is considered that it is a usurpation in the name of Slavery. It is hard to think that Congress was driven to unconstitutional assumption in such a cause, and that, contrary to sovereign rules of interpretation, it leaned to Slavery rather than to Freedom. But the time has come at last when it may recover the attitude belonging to it under the Constitution. In advising the repeal of the Fugitive Slave Act, it is enough to show that it is founded on usurpation by Congress of power not granted by the Constitution. But, even admitting the power, a slight examination will show that it has been executed in defiance of the Constitution.