The magnitude of this concession may be seen in three aspects: _first_, in the immunities it confers, putting an embryo of Rebel Slavery on _equality_ with established governments, making its cruisers lawful instead of piratical, and opening to them boundless facilities at sea and in port, so that they may obtain supplies and hospitality; _secondly_, in the degradation it fastens upon the National Government, which is condemned to see its ships treated on _equality_ with the ships of Rebel Slavery, and also the just rule of “neutrality” between belligerent powers invoked to fetter its activity against a giant felony; and, _thirdly_, in the disturbance to commerce it sanctions, by letting loose lawless sea-rovers armed with belligerent rights, including the right of search, whose natural recklessness is left unbridled and without remedy even from diplomatic intercourse. The ocean is a common highway; but it is for the interest of all who traverse it that the highway should not be disturbed by predatory hostilities. Such a concession should be made with the greatest caution, and then only under the necessity of the case, on the overwhelming authority of _the fact_: for, from beginning to end, it is simply a question of fact, absolutely dependent on those conditions and prerequisites without which ocean belligerence cannot exist. As a general rule, belligerent rights are conceded only where a rebel government or contending party in a civil war has acquired such form and body, that, for the time being, within certain limits, it is sovereign _de facto_, so far at least as to command troops and _to administer justice_. On this last point I dwell especially. It is the capacity to administer justice which is the criterion, whether on land or ocean. The concession of belligerence is the recognition of such limited sovereignty, which bears the same relation to acknowledged independence as gristle bears to bone. It is obvious that such sovereignty may exist _de facto_ on land without existing _de facto_ on ocean. It may prevail in armies, and yet fail in navies. In short, _the fact_ may be one way on land and the other way _on ocean_. Nor can it be inferred on ocean simply from existence on land. Our Supreme Court has declared that there may be “a limited, partial war,” “a restrained or limited hostility,” “an imperfect war, or a war as to certain objects and to a certain extent.” Thus, on one occasion, hostilities were authorized “on the high seas by certain persons in certain cases,” but without authority “to commit hostilities on land.”[143] But by the same rule there may be war on land and not on sea, and this may follow from the necessity of the case. If Rebel Slavery does not come within the conditions of ocean war, then, whatever its belligerence on land, it cannot expect it on the ocean. Since every such concession is adverse to the original government, and is made only under the necessity of the case, it must be limited carefully to _the actual