There is a rule of interpretation which the Senator will not call in question. Where any language is open to two constructions, one beneficent and the other odious, _that which is odious must be rejected_. I do not stop to adduce authorities. The rule is unquestionable, and the authorities are ample. But keep in mind the conclusion: that which is odious must be rejected. Now the Senator has already admitted that the language of the clause is applicable to apprentices. Very well. That is enough. In its application to apprentices, redemptioners, and the like, it is exhausted, so that it cannot be made to cover a slave without offending against the rule requiring us to adopt the construction least odious. And, Sir, if we go further and closely scan the clause, we find that the words employed are all applicable to a relation of _contract_ or _debt_, and not to a relation founded on _force_. The clause is applicable to a “person,” and not to a _thing_, and this “person” is to be surrendered on claim of the person to whom his service or labor may be _due_. But, clearly, no labor or service can be _due_ from slave to master. The whole pretension is an absurdity. And if you give to this word its legitimate application, you must restrict it to a case of _contract_ or _debt_. In this reply I omit the argument founded on history, and the well-known opinions of leading minds in the Convention, confining myself to the text of the Constitution. But the Senator dwells especially on the words “held to service or labor in one State _under the laws thereof_,” and triumphantly declares that slaves were included under this language. Here again he is mistaken. Apprentices and redemptioners were held under “laws”; but I need not remind the Senator of the admission repeatedly made on this floor by Mr. Mason, author of the last Fugitive Slave Act, that there were no “laws” for Slavery in any Slave State,--at least, that none could be produced. Besides, as a jurist, the Senator surely will recollect the ancient truth, that injustice cannot be “law,” but is always to be regarded as an “abuse” or a “violence,” even though expressed in the form of “law.” In presence of this principle, which has the sanction of as great a lawyer as St. Augustine, and in the face of the positive assertion of Mr. Mason, that no “law” for Slavery can be found in the Slave States, what becomes of the argument of the Senator? Sir, the case is clear. No ingenuity of honest effort can ever make the words cited by the Senator, or any other words in that much debated clause, sanction Slavery and the hunting of slaves. To proceed with his argument, the Senator must begin by setting aside those commanding rules of interpretation which are binding on him as on myself. If, where words are susceptible of two significations, one beneficent and the other odious, the former only can be taken, then must the Senator restrict this clause to that signification which is not odious.