The terms of the “guaranty” are general, and it was “forever.” Even if limited to _defensive_ war, it would be difficult to say that France was not engaged in such a war, with the added incident that it was a war by a combination of kings to overcome a republic. France was alone, with the royalties of Europe embattled against her. Only after the execution of the King England joined this array, lending to it invincible navies. But, according to official avowals, it was what King George called “the atrocious act recently perpetrated at Paris”[150] that finally prompted the part she undertook, and her real object, in the language of Mr. Fox, was no other than “the destruction of the internal Government of France.”[151] The case was unprecedented; but it is difficult to say that it did not come under the “guaranty.” The _casus fœderis_ had occurred. If France did not exact performance, that is no reason why our obligations should be disowned, when, at the present moment, we are trying to arrive at some appreciation of their extent. A careful examination of the treaty shows that the “guaranty” became primarily obligatory on the occurrence of _a rupture between France and England_. Nothing is said or suggested as to the character of the war, whether offensive or defensive. It is enough that there was “a rupture.” In such a case, the “guaranty,” according to the illustration of Cicero, was, _tanquam gladius in vagina_, at the disposal of France. Our Secretary of State, even while seeking to limit its application, seems to have seen it prospectively in this light, when, in his instructions of July 15, 1797, to our plenipotentiaries, Messrs. Pinckney, Marshall, and Gerry, he said, “Our guaranty of the possessions of France in America will perpetually expose us to the risk and expense of war, or to disputes and questions concerning our national faith.”[152]