This duty is fortified by the Constitutional Amendment, which, after providing for the abolition of Slavery, empowers Congress to “enforce” it by “appropriate legislation,” thus heaping Ossa upon Pelion. Clearly, under these words, Congress may do what in its discretion seems “appropriate” to this end, and there is no power to call its action in question. On this point the authority of the Supreme Court, in the weighty judgment of Chief Justice Marshall, is explicit. “The government which has a right to do an act, and has imposed on it the duty of performing that act, must, according to the dictates of reason, be allowed to select the means; and those who contend that it may not select _any appropriate means_, that one particular mode of effecting the object is excepted, take upon themselves the burden of establishing that exception.… “Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the Constitution, and _all means_ which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, are constitutional.”[186] These words of the Chief Justice are reinforced by a kindred declaration from another great authority, Mr. Justice Story, speaking also for the Supreme Court, on an important occasion. “The Constitution unavoidably deals in general language.… The instrument was not intended to provide merely for the exigencies of a few years, but was to endure through a long lapse of ages, the events of which were locked up in the inscrutable purposes of Providence.… Hence its powers are expressed in general terms, leaving to the Legislature from time to time _to adopt its own means to effectuate legitimate objects_.”[187] Apply these words to the present case, and the conclusion is irresistible. Whatever legislation seems “appropriate” to “enforce” the abolition of Slavery, whatever means seem proper to this end, must be within the powers of Congress under the Constitutional Amendment. You cannot deny this principle without setting aside those most remarkable judgments which stand as landmarks of constitutional history. But who can doubt that the abolition of the whole Black Code, in all its oligarchical pretensions, civil and political, is “appropriate” to “enforce” the abolition of Slavery? Mark the language of the grant. Congress may “enforce” abolition, and nobody can question the “means” it thinks best to employ. Let it not hesitate to adopt the “means” that promise to be most effective. As the occasion is extraordinary, so the “means” employed must be extraordinary.