We have seen how the President, in carrying forward his usurpation in the interest of the Rebellion, trifled with the Senate in regard to appointments, and abused the traditional power of removal, openly threatening good citizens in office that he would “kick them out,” and filling all vacancies, from high to low, with creatures whose first promise was to sustain his barbarous policy. I do not stop to portray this outrage, constituting an impeachable offence, according to the declared opinion of Mr. Madison,[200] one of the strongest advocates of the Presidential power of removal. Congress, instead of adopting the remedy suggested by this father of the Constitution, and expelling the President by process of impeachment, attempted to wrest from him the power he was abusing. For this purpose the Tenure-of-Office Act was passed. It was deemed advisable to include the Cabinet officers within its protection; but, considering the intimate relations between them and the President, a proviso was appended, securing to the latter the right of choosing them in the first instance. Its object was, where the President finds himself, on accession to office, confronted by a hostile Senate, to assure this right of choice, without obliging him to keep the Cabinet of his predecessor; and accordingly it says to him, “Choose your own Cabinet, but expect to abide by your choice, unless you can obtain the consent of the Senate to a change.” Any other conclusion is flat absurdity. It begins by misconstruing the operative words of the proviso, that the Cabinet officers “shall hold their offices respectively for and during the term of the President by whom they may have been appointed.” On the face there is no ambiguity here. Only by going outside can any be found, and this disappears on a brief inquiry. At the date of the statute Andrew Johnson had been in office nearly two years. Some of his Cabinet were originally appointed by President Lincoln; others had been formally appointed by himself. But all were there equally by his approval and consent. One may do an act himself, or make it his own by ratifying it, when done by another. In law it is equally his act. Andrew Johnson did not originally appoint Mr. Stanton, Mr. Seward, or Mr. Welles, but he adopted their appointments; so that at the passage of the statute they stood on the same footing as if originally appointed by him. Practically, and in the sense of the statute, they were appointed by him. They were a Cabinet of his own choice, just as much as the Cabinet of his successor, duly appointed, will be of his own choice. If the statute compels the latter, as it clearly does, to abide by his choice, it is unreasonable to suppose that it is not equally obligatory on Andrew Johnson. Otherwise there is special immunity for the President whose misconduct rendered it necessary, and Congress is exhibited as legislating for some future unknown President, and not for Andrew Johnson, already too well known.