Great efforts have been made to show that Mr. Stanton does not come within the special protection of the proviso, without considering the irresistible consequence that he is then within the general protection of the statute, being “a person holding a civil office.” Turn him out of the proviso and he falls into the statute, unless you are as imaginative as one of the apologists, who placed him in a sort of intermediate limbo, like a lost spirit floating in space, as in one of Flaxman’s Illustrations of Dante. But the imagination of this conception cannot make us insensible to its surpassing absurdity. It is utterly unreasonable, and every construction must be rejected which is inconsistent with common sense. SUSPENSION OF MR. STANTON RECOGNIZED HIM AS PROTECTED BY THE STATUTE. Here I might close this part of the case; but there is another illustration. In suspending Mr. Stanton from office, as long ago as August, the President himself recognized that he was protected by the statute. The facts are familiar. The President, in formal words, undertook to say that the suspension was by virtue of the Constitution; but this was a dishonest pretext, in harmony with so much in his career. Whatever he may say, his acts speak louder than his words. In notice of the suspension to the Secretary of the Treasury, and then again in a message to the Senate assigning his reasons for the suspension, both being according to requirements of the statute, he testified, that, in his judgment at that time, Mr. Stanton came within its protection. If not, why thus elaborately comply with its requirements? Why the notice to the Secretary of the Treasury? Why the message to the Senate? All this was novel and without example. Why write to General Grant of “being sustained” by the Senate? Approval or disapproval of the Senate could make no difference in the exercise of the power he now sets up. Approval could not confirm the suspension; disapproval could not restore the suspended Secretary of War. In fine, why suspend at all? Why exercise the power of suspension, when the President sets up the power of removal? If Mr. Stanton was unfit for office and a thorn in his side, why not remove him at once? Why resort to this long and untried experiment merely to remove at last? There is but one answer. Beyond all question the President thought Mr. Stanton protected by the statute, and sought to remove him according to its provisions, beginning, therefore, with his suspension. Failing in this, he undertook to remove him in contravention of the statute, relying in justification on his pretension to judge of its constitutionality, or the pusillanimity of Congress, or something else “to turn up,” which should render justification unnecessary.