Ingenuity seeks to perplex the question by putting impossible cases. For instance, suppose Congress should have lost its wits so far as to enact, in direct terms, that the President should not be commander-in-chief of the army and navy, or that he should not have the power to grant pardons; and suppose, still further, that Congress, in defiance of positive inhibition, should undertake to create “titles of nobility”; must not the President treat such enactments as unconstitutional? Of course he must; but such instances do not help the prerogative now claimed. Every such enactment would be on its face unconstitutional. It would be an act of unreasoning madness, which President as well as Court must disregard as if plain nonsense. Its unconstitutionality would be like an axiom, not to be questioned. No argument or authority is needed. It proves itself. Nor would the duty of disobedience be less obligatory, even if the enactment were sanctioned by the Supreme Court: and it is not more violent for me to suppose it sanctioned by the Supreme Court than for the apologists to suppose it sanctioned by Congress. The enactment would be a self-evident monstrosity, and therefore to be disobeyed, as if one of the Ten Commandments were reversed so as to read, “Thou shalt kill.” Such extreme cases serve no purpose. The National Constitution is the supreme law of the land, and the people will not allow its axiomatic requirements to be set aside. An illustration outside the limits of reason is of no value. In the cases supposed, the unconstitutionally of the enactment is axiomatic, excluding opinion or argument. It is matter of fact, and not matter of opinion. When the case is one on which there are two sides or two different views, it is then within the domain of argument. It is in no sense axiomatic. It is no longer matter of fact, but matter of opinion. When submitted to the Supreme Court, it is for their “opinion.” Without occupying time with refinements, I content myself with asserting that the judgment of the Court must be matter of opinion. One of the apologists has asserted that such a judgment is matter of fact, and, generally, that the constitutionality of a statute is matter of fact. I assert the contrary. When a bench of judges stands five to four, shall we say that the majority declare a “fact,” and the minority declare an “opinion”?