The proposition was rejected by the decisive vote of eight States in the negative to three in the affirmative. We all see, in reading it now, that it was rejected on good grounds. It would obviously be improper to confer upon the other branch of Congress the power, by its own vote, to bring about a suspension of the Chief Magistrate. But it did not follow, because the Convention rejected the proposition that a suspension could take place on a simple vote of the House of Representatives, that therefore the President could not be suspended. When the Senate was declared to have the sole power to try impeachments, it was by necessary implication invested with the power, incident to every court, and known historically to belong to the English court of impeachment, from which ours was borrowed, of suspending the party accused. All this was apparent at the time, if possible, more clearly than now. It was so clear, that it furnishes an all-sufficient reason for the provision that the Chief Justice should preside on the trial of the President, without resorting to the later reason which has been put forward in this debate. But we are not driven to speculate on this question. While the Constitution was under discussion in the Virginia Convention, George Mason objected to some of the powers conferred upon the President, especially the pardoning power. This was on June 18, 1788, and will be found under that date in the reports of the Virginia Convention. This earnest opponent of the Constitution said that the President might “pardon crimes which were advised by himself,” and thus further his own ambitious schemes. This brought forward Mr. Madison, who had sat, as we all know, throughout the debates of the National Convention, and had recorded its proceedings, and who, of all persons, was the most competent to testify at that time as to the intention of the framers. What said this eminent authority? I give you his words:-- “There is one security in this case to which gentlemen may not have adverted. If the President be connected in any suspicious manner with any person, and there be grounds to believe he will shelter him, the House of Representatives can impeach him; they”-- evidently referring to the Senate, or the Senate in connection with the House-- “can remove him, if found guilty; _they can suspend him, when suspected_, and the power will devolve on the Vice-President.”[95] Mark well these words,--“they can suspend him, when suspected.” If only suspected, the President can be suspended. What next? “And his power will devolve on the Vice-President.” In which event, of course, the Vice-President would be occupied elsewhere than in this Chamber.