OPINION IN THE CASE OF THE IMPEACHMENT OF ANDREW JOHNSON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, MARCH 31, 1868. In the course of this trial there was an important claim of power by the Chief Justice, as presiding officer of the Senate, on which at the time Mr. Sumner expressed his opinion to the Senate, when it withdrew for consultation. As this claim was calculated in certain contingencies to affect the course of proceedings, possibly the final judgment, and as it might hereafter be drawn into a precedent, Mr. Sumner was unwilling to lose this opportunity of recording his reasons against it. In determining the relations of the Chief Justice to the trial of the President, we must look, first, to the National Constitution; for it is solely by virtue of the National Constitution that this eminent magistrate is transported from his own natural field to another, where he is for the time an exotic. The Chief Justice in his own court is at home; but it is equally clear, that, when he comes into the Senate, he is a stranger. Though justly received with welcome and honor, he cannot expect membership, or anything beyond the powers derived directly from the National Constitution, by virtue of which he temporarily occupies the Chair. Repairing to our authoritative text, we find the only applicable words:-- “The Senate shall have the sole power to try all impeachments.… When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall _preside_: and no person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two thirds of the members present.” This is all. The Chief Justice shall _preside_, but subject to two limitations specifically declared. First, the trial is to be by the Senate _solely_, and nobody else,--thus carefully excluding the presiding officer from all participation, except so far as is implied in the power to preside; and, secondly, judgment of conviction can be only by a vote of “two thirds of _the members present_,”--thus again excluding the presiding officer, unless it is assumed that he is a member of the Senate. On the face of this text it is difficult to find ambiguity. Nobody questions that the Chief Justice must preside. Can anybody question that the trial must be by the Senate solely, and nobody else? To change this requirement is to fly in the face of the National Constitution. Can anybody question that the judgment of conviction must be by votes of “members present,” and nobody else? Now, since the Chief Justice is not a “member” of the Senate, it is plain that he is positively excluded from vote on the final question. It only remains that he should “preside.” And here the question recurs as to the meaning of this familiar term.