Not only to England must we go, but also to Parliamentary Law, as recognized in England at the adoption of the National Constitution. The powers of a presiding officer, where not specifically declared, must be found in Parliamentary Law. The very term _preside_ is parliamentary. It belongs to the technicalities of this branch of law, as much as _indict_ belongs to the technicalities of the Common Law. In determining the signification of this term, it will be of little avail to show some local usage, or, perhaps, some decision of a court. The usage or decision of a Parliament must be shown. Against this all vague speculation or divination of reason is futile. I will not encumber this discussion by superfluous authorities. Insisting that this question must be determined by Parliamentary Law, I content myself with adducing the often cited words of Lord Coke:-- “And as every court of justice hath laws and customs for its direction, some by the Common Law, some by the Civil and Canon Law, some by peculiar laws and customs, etc., so the High Court of Parliament _suis propriis legibus et consuetudinibus subsistit_. It is _lex et consuetudo Parliamenti_, that all weighty matters in any Parliament, moved concerning the peers of the realm, or commons in Parliament assembled, _ought to be determined and adjudged and discussed by the course of the Parliament_, and not by the Civil Law, nor yet by the common laws of this realm used in more inferior courts.”[99] Here is the true rule. To “the course of the Parliament” we must resort. In “the course of the Parliament” we must find all the powers of a presiding officer, and all that is implied in the authority to preside. “The Chief Justice shall preside.” Such is the Constitution. Nothing is specified with regard to his powers; nothing is said. What was intended is left to inference from the language employed, which must be interpreted according to “the course of the Parliament,” precisely as what was intended by trial by jury is ascertained from the Common Law. In the latter case we go to the Common Law; in the former case we go to “the course of the Parliament.” You may as well turn away from the Common Law in the one as from “the course of the Parliament” in the other. In determining “the course of the Parliament” we resort to the summary of text-writers, and, better still, to the authentic instances of history.