“I affirm, that, as a presiding officer, the Vice-President has no inherent power whatever, unless that of doing what the Senate may prescribe by its rules be such a power. There are, indeed, inherent powers; but they are in the _body_, and not in the _officer_. He is a mere agent to execute the will of the former. He can exercise no power which he does not hold by delegation, either express or implied.”[139] Then again, in reply to an illustration that had been employed, he says:-- “There is not the least analogy between the rights and duties of a judge and those of a presiding officer in a deliberative assembly. The analogy is altogether the other way. It is between the Court and the House.”[140] It would be difficult to answer this reasoning. Unless all the precedents, in unbroken series, are set aside, a presiding officer not a member of the Senate has no inherent power except to occupy the Chair and to put the question. All else must be derived from grant in the Constitution or in the rules of the body. In the absence of any such grant, we must be contented to observe the mandates of the _Lex Parliamentaria_. The objections of Mr. Calhoun brought to light the feeble powers of our presiding officer, and a remedy was forthwith applied by amendment of the rules, making it his duty to call to order. To his general power as presiding officer was superadded, by express rule, a further power not existing by Parliamentary Law; and such is the rule of the Senate at this day. I turn away from this Vice-Presidential episode, contenting myself with reminding you how clearly it shows, that, independently of the rules of the Senate, the presiding officer _as such_ had small powers; that he could do very little more than put the question and direct the Secretary; and, in short, that our fathers, in the interpretation of his powers, had tacitly recognized the time-honored and prevailing usage of Parliament, which in itself is a commanding law. But a Chief Justice, when presiding in the Senate, is not less under this commanding law than the Vice-President. * * * * * Thus far I have confined myself to the Parliamentary Law governing the upper House of Parliament and of Congress. Further illustration is found in the position of the Speaker, whether in the House of Commons or the House of Representatives. One cardinal distinction is to be noted at the outset, by which, in both countries, he is distinguished from the presiding officer of the upper House: the Speaker is always a member of the House. As a member he has a constituency which is represented through him; and here is another difference. The presiding officer of the upper House has no constituency; therefore his only duty is _to preside_, unless some other function be superadded by the National Constitution or the rules of the body.