But while the importance of doing equity always is a paramount duty, the Committee feel that there is something in the negotiation under which this surplus accrued which should make us particularly careful lest we fail to do equity. It will be observed that the sum received from China was on account of certain claims of our citizens, and that it was in no sense a national indemnity; in other words, the consideration was specific, and not general in character. The preamble of the convention recites that it was entered into “for the satisfaction of claims of American citizens,”--thus expressly excluding any other consideration. With regard to these claims the Chinese had little or no information, while our Minister saw clearly, that, with the disallowance of those doubtful, which he regarded as probable, there would be a surplus. His words were: “If they be recognized, the fund will be exhausted. If they be disallowed, there will be a surplus at the disposition of the Government.”[137] The actual surplus was about thirty-three and a third per cent. of the amount stipulated, and about fifty per cent. of the amount awarded to claimants. The considerableness of this sum is another reason why we should hesitate to take advantage of a transaction where we were so situated as to be the best informed on the matter in issue. If we did not know everything bearing on it, we knew much more than the Chinese. In fact, the Chinese acted in the dark; and here we have the testimony of Mr. Williams, the interpreter of our Minister in the negotiation, and still an honored servant of the Government, who has said in a dispatch: “No list was presented to the Chinese by Mr. Reed”; and again, “The United States Government was made the sole judge of the justice of the claims”; and then again, “In reality, they [the Chinese] paid the demands made upon them by the English and French Ministers, as well as the American, _under pressure_.”[138] If this were so,--and one of our own officers is the witness,--the equity of the Chinese becomes more apparent. Obviously, they were unable to examine the claims, and did not pretend to examine them. Everything was left to the United States. And this was done while the ancient empire was torn by civil war, aggravated by the menacing attitudes of England and France. It is not too much to say that it was done “under pressure.” According to well-known authorities, a deed made under _duress_ may be set aside; and this rule of jurisprudence shows a just sensitiveness with regard to that absolute freedom which is essential to the life of a contract. Such a rule, if applied in the intercourse of nations, would invalidate most of those conventions after war or menace by which one power has assumed obligations to another, and, indeed, would strike at war and menace as modes of pursuing a claim. In the present case the validity of the convention is not called in question; but,