Just following the close of that conference a cable was sent to the United States asking the possibility of manufacturing ethylene chlorhydrin, the principal element in the manufacture of mustard gas by the only process then known. Later, that is about the middle of October, a cablegram was sent urging investigation into the manufacture of this gas. It is believed a great deal of time might have been saved had the policy of undue secrecy not been adopted by the British and others before the Americans entered the war. In fact we were only told in whispers the formula for mustard gas, and where a description of it could be found in German chemistries. This was arrant nonsense since if the Germans had gotten all mustard gas information then in the hands of the British they would have received far less information than they already possessed on mustard gas. [Illustration: FIG. 17.—“Who Said Gas?”] Whether the information sent to the United States on mustard gas ultimately proved of any great value is an open question since the methods adopted in the United States were very greatly superior to those used in England and in France. It probably helped by suggestion rather than by actual details of design. Anyhow it all emphasizes the difficulties encountered in war when so vital a substance as mustard gas must be investigated after the enemy has begun using it on a large scale. =Delay of British Masks.= As December 1 approached, and as nothing further had been heard of the order for 300,000 British Respirators placed about the middle of October, a telegram was sent to England asking if deliveries would be made as required in the order for the masks. This order required the first 75,000 to be delivered December 1, 1917. In reply it was stated that the British could not furnish these masks, and that they understood that the Americans were just beginning a large output of masks in the United States. An exchange of cablegrams with the United States showed that no masks could be expected from there for 3 to 5 months. Moreover it became increasingly evident that the Americans were going into the battle line sooner than at first contemplated. Another cablegram was then sent to England urging the delivery of these masks. The reply was to the effect that the English Government could not deliver the masks because they did not have enough for their own use. This situation was very serious. Unless the order for 300,000 masks placed with the British could be filled, we were facing the necessity of sending American troops into the front line with only the French M-2 mask. While the M-2 mask was then the only mask used by the French, it was well known to afford practically no protection against the high concentrations of phosgene obtained from cloud or projector attacks. And it was just such attacks as these that our men would encounter in the front line during training. Accordingly arrangements were made for a hurried trip to England.