Such increasing facilities for movement ultimately render an attacking force irresistible, for the reason that it finally becomes a physical impossibility for the opposing equal force to provide valid defences for the numerous tactical keys, which at a given time become simultaneously assailed. Hence: PRINCIPLE _Superior facilities for occupying any point at any time and with any force, always ensure the superior force at a given point, at a given time._ The relative advantage in mobility possessed by one army over an opposing army always can be determined by the following, viz.: RULE 1. That army whose strategic front of operations is established upon the Strategetic Center has the relative advantage in Mobility. 2. To utilize the advantage in Mobility extend the Strategic Front in the direction of the objective plane. 3. To neutralize the relative disadvantage in Mobility eliminate that adverse Corps d’armee which tactically expresses such adverse advantage; or so post the Prime Strategetic Point as to vitiate the adverse Strategic front. Advantage in Mobility is divided into two classes, viz.: I. General Advantage in Mobility. II. Special Advantage in Mobility. A General Advantage in Mobility consists in the ability to act simultaneously against two or more vital points by means of interior logistic radii due to position between:-- 1. The adverse army and its Base of Operations. 2. Two or more adverse Grand Columns. 3. The wings of a hostile Grand Column. 4. Two or more isolated adverse Corps d’armee. Such position upon interior lines of movement is secured by occupying either of the Prime Offensive Origins, _i.e._: 1. Strategic Center _vs._ Adverse Formation in Mass. 2. Logistic Center _vs._ Adverse Formation by Grand Columns. 3. Tactical Center _vs._ Adverse Formation by Wings. 4. Logistic Triune _vs._ Adverse Formation by Corps. Special Advantage in Mobility consists in the ability of a corps d’armee to traverse greater or equal distances in lesser times than opposing corps. MILITARY EXAMPLES _“Never interrupt your enemy when he is making a false movement.”--Napoleon._ In the year (366 B.C.) the King of Sparta, with an army of 30,000 men marched to the aid of the Mantineans against Thebes. Epaminondas took up a post with his army from whence he equally threatened Mantinea and Sparta. Agesilaus incautiously moved too far towards the coast, whereupon Epaminondas, with 70,000 men precipitated himself upon Lacedaemonia, laying waste the country with fire and sword, all but taking by storm the city of Sparta and showing the women of Lacedaemonia the campfire of an enemy for the first time in six hundred years. * * * * *