The economic activities of children in city streets, commonly called street trades, are not specifically covered by the provisions of child labor laws except in the District of Columbia and the states of Massachusetts, Missouri, New York, Oklahoma, Colorado, Utah, Nevada, New Hampshire and Wisconsin. The laws of many other states as well as of those mentioned, however, prohibit children under fourteen years of age from being employed or permitted to work in the distribution or transmission of merchandise or messages. If newspapers are merchandise, then children under fourteen years would not be allowed to deliver newspapers under the provision just stated. This raises a nice question as to what is included in the term "merchandise." That there is any distinction between newspapers and merchandise is practically denied by the street-trades laws of Utah and New Hampshire which provide that children under certain ages shall not sell "newspapers, magazines, periodicals or _other_ merchandise in any street or public place"; the question of delivery, however, is left open by these laws. The Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, in the case of District of Columbia _vs._ Reider, sustained the juvenile court of the District in its decision that newspapers are not merchandise and consequently that children under fourteen years of age engaged in delivering newspapers are not affected by the law.[140] The judge of the trial court stated in his opinion, "No one will seriously contend that the nature of the employment in the case at bar is at all harmful to the child." The case at bar was the prosecution of a route agent for a morning newspaper on account of having employed a minor under fourteen years of age to deliver newspapers. This opinion is typical of the misplaced sympathy so commonly bestowed upon these young "merchants" of the street. In the case cited, the court permitted itself to be drawn aside into an interpretation of the letter of the law instead of viewing the matter in the light of its spirit. The purpose of such a law is to _prevent the labor_ of children, not to distinguish between closely related forms of labor. Its object is to afford protection, not to provoke discussion of purely technical points. The _labor_ of delivering merchandise does not differ in any respect from the _labor_ of delivering newspapers (the possibly greater weight of merchandise does not alter the case, inasmuch as it is usually carried about in wagons); and as the child labor law of the District of Columbia forbids the delivery of merchandise by children under fourteen years at any time, it follows that the delivery of newspapers by such children should not be allowed, because the intent of the law is to protect them from the probable consequences of such work. Moreover, the District of Columbia law prohibits children under sixteen years from delivering merchandise before six o'clock in the morning; yet, under the interpretation given