Nevertheless beneath the outward prosperity a smouldering fire was burning. The slogan of Balmaceda “Chile for the Chileans” aroused the opposition of foreign interests. The reduction of ecclesiastical fees and stipends, and the enforcement of the civil marriage law, kept the opposition of the clergy alive. The jealousy of the old families, who had heretofore been supreme in the government, to the new democratic measures advocated by Balmaceda were aroused. Furthermore the election of Balmaceda was really not by a party, but the result of a temporary coalition of three discordant elements. By 1889 Balmaceda had succeeded in arousing the enmity of practically all the parties. The progressive elements had split into nationals, liberals, dissentient-liberals and radicals. Continual changes in his cabinet followed, and one group was substituted for another every few months. It had been the ambition of Balmaceda to unite all the liberal elements into one party, but in this he had signally failed. Balmaceda soon found himself without a majority in Congress, and with no prospect of securing one. Heretofore a majority had sometimes been acquired by the trading of votes among the different factions in exchange for a share of patronage. Even this method no longer availed. The idea gradually became prevalent that the President was plotting to build up a strong personal following, in order to establish a dictatorship and replace with it the power of Congress. Circumstances, as much as anything else, practically forced Balmaceda into this position. He believed in himself and his own motives, and the selfishness of the different liberal groups irritated him. All of this turmoil was galling to a man of the character of Balmaceda. Reformation of various evils was his aim, but he found himself thwarted at every turn. He soon grasped the fact that if he could control Congress, he could settle the vexed questions which, in his opinion, retarded the development of his country. Furthermore, he gave a wider interpretation to the constitution in relation to the powers of the executive than did the legislative body. Congress finally refused to pass appropriation bills or vote supplies for the army, and, in retaliation, Balmaceda dissolved Congress, which he claimed he had a right to do under the constitution of 1833. In January, 1890, he appointed a cabinet composed exclusively of personal followers, and these new ministers announced that they would hold office so long as they were satisfactory to the President, regardless of Congress. A definite rupture was inevitable, for the breach had become so wide that temporizing was impossible. Balmaceda must either resign or assume dictatorial powers. He chose the latter.