Chips from a German Workshop, Volume 1: Essays on the Science of ReligionMüller, F. Max (Friedrich Max)
Religion
Chips from a German Workshop, Volume 1: Essays on the Science of Religion
Müller, F. Max (Friedrich Max)
Comparative linguistics; Folklore; Literature -- History and criticism; Mythology; Religions
This primitive intuition of God, however, was in itself neither
monotheistic nor polytheistic, though it might become either,
according to the expression which it took in the languages of man. It
was this primitive intuition which supplied either the subject or the
predicate in all the religions of the world, and without it no
religion, whether true or false, whether revealed or natural, could
have had even its first beginning. It is too often forgotten by those
who believe that a polytheistic worship was the most natural
unfolding of religious life, that polytheism must everywhere have been
preceded by a more or less conscious theism. In no language does the
plural exist before the singular. No human mind could have conceived
the idea of gods without having previously conceived the idea of a
god. It would be, however, quite as great a mistake to imagine,
because the idea of a god must exist previously to that of gods, that
therefore a belief in One God preceded everywhere the belief in many
gods. A belief in God as exclusively One, involves a distinct negation
of more than one God, and that negation is possible only after the
conception, whether real or imaginary, of many gods.
The primitive intuition of the Godhead is neither monotheistic nor
polytheistic, and it finds its most natural expression in the simplest
and yet the most important article of faith--that God is God. This
must have been the faith of the ancestors of mankind previously to any
division of race or confusion of tongues. It might seem, indeed, as if
in such a faith the oneness of God, though not expressly asserted, was
implied, and that it existed, though latent, in the first revelation
of God. History, however, proves that the question of oneness was yet
undecided in that primitive faith, and that the intuition of God was
not yet secured against the illusions of a double vision. There are,
in reality, two kinds of oneness which, when we enter into
metaphysical discussions, must be carefully distinguished, and which
for practical purposes are well kept separate by the definite and
indefinite articles. There is one kind of oneness which does not
exclude the idea of plurality; there is another which does. When we
say that Cromwell was a Protector of England, we do not assert that he
was the only protector. But if we say that he was the Protector of
England, it is understood that he was the only man who enjoyed that
title. If, therefore, an expression had been given to that primitive
intuition of the Deity, which is the mainspring of all later religion,
it would have been--'There is a God,' but not yet 'There is but "One
God."' The latter form of faith, the belief in One God, is properly
called monotheism, whereas the term of henotheism would best express
the faith in a single god.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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