[Footnote 136: _Enn_. iv. 5. 3, [Greek: sympathes to zôon tode to pan heautô]; iv. 9. 1, [Greek: hôste emou pathontos synaisthanesthai to pan].] [Footnote 137: _Enn_. iv. 5. 2, [Greek: sympatheia amydra].] [Footnote 138: See Bigg, _Neoplatonism_, pp. 203, 204. He shows that with the Stoics, who were Pantheists, the Logos was regarded as a first cause; while with the Neoplatonists, who were Theists and Transcendentalists, it was a secondary cause. In Plotinus, the Intelligence ([Greek: Nous]) is "King" (_Enn_. v. 3. 3), and "the law of Being" (_Enn_. v. 9. 5). But the Johannine Logos is both immanent and transcendent. When Erigena says, "Certius cognoscas verbum Naturam omnium esse," he gives a true but incomplete account of the Nature of the Second Person of the Trinity.] [Footnote 139: See especially the interesting passage, _Enn_. i. 8. 3.] [Footnote 140: _Enn_. i. 8. 13, [Greek: eti anthrôpikon hê kakia, memigmenê tini enantiô].] [Footnote 141: The "civil virtues" are the four cardinal virtues. Plotinus says that justice is mainly "minding one's business" [Greek: oikeiopagia]. "The purifying virtues" deliver us from sin; but [Greek: hê spoudê ouk exô hamartias einai, alla theon einai].] [Footnote 142: Compare Hegel's criticism of Schelling, in the latter's Asiatic period, "This so-called wisdom, instead of being yielded up to the influence of Divinity _by its contempt of all proportion and definiteness_, does really nothing but give full play to accident and caprice. Nothing was ever produced by such a process better than mere dreams" (_Vorrede zur Phänomenologie_, p. 6).] [Footnote 143: Heb. viii. 5.] [Footnote 144: _Enn_. iii. 8. 4, [Greek: hotan asthenêsôsin eis to theôrein, skian theôrias kai logou tên praxin poiountai]. Cf. Amiel's _Journal_, p. 4, "action is coarsened thought."] [Footnote 145: _Enn_. iii. 2. 15, [Greek: hypokriseis] and [Greek: paignion]; and see iv. 3. 32, on love of family and country.] [Footnote 146: _Enn_. vi. 7. 34.] [Footnote 147: It would be an easy and rather amusing task to illustrate these and other aberrations of speculative Mysticism from Herbert Spencer's philosophy. E.g., he says that, though we cannot know the Absolute, we may have "an indefinite consciousness of it." "It is impossible to give to this consciousness any qualitative or quantitative expression whatever," and yet it is quite certain that we have it. Herbert Spencer's Absolute is, in fact, _matter without form_. This would seem to identify it rather with the all but non-existing "matter" of Plotinus (see Bigg, _Neoplatonism_, p. 199), than with the superessential "One"; but the later Neoplatonists found themselves compelled to call _both_ extremes [Greek: to mê on]. Plotinus struggles hard against this conclusion, which threatens to make shipwreck of his Platonism. "Hierotheus," whose sympathies are really with Indian nihilism, welcomes it.]