1. We have an ineradicable, and, as it would seem, an intuitive faith in the real existence of an external world distinct from our sensations, and also of a personal self, which we call "I," "myself," as distinct from "my sensations," and "my feelings." We find, also, that this is confessedly the common belief of mankind. There have been a few philosophers who have affected to treat this belief as a "mere prejudice," an "illusion;" but they have never been able, practically, so to regard and treat it. Their language, just as plainly as the language of the common people, betrays their instinctive faith in an outer world, and proves their utter inability to emancipate themselves from this "prejudice," if such it may please them to call it. In view of this acknowledged fact, we ask--Does the term "_permanent possibility of sensations_" exhaust all that is contained in this conception of an external world? This evening I _remember_ that at noonday I beheld the sun, and experienced a sensation of warmth whilst exposing myself to his rays; and I _expect_ that to-morrow, under the same conditions, I shall experience the same sensations. I now _remember_ that last evening I extinguished my light and attempted to leave my study, but, coming in contact with the closed door, experienced a sense of resistance to my muscular effort, by a solid and extended body exterior to myself; and I _expect_ that this evening, under the same circumstances, I shall experience the same sensations. Now, does a belief in "a permanent possibility of sensations" explain all these experiences? does it account for that immediate knowledge of an _external_ object which I had on looking at the sun, or that presentative knowledge of _resistance_ and _extension_, and of an extended, resisting _substance_, I had when in contact with the door of my study? Mr. Mill very confidently affirms that this belief includes all; and this phrase expresses all the meaning attached to extended "matter" and resisting "substance" by the common world.[239] We as confidently affirm that it does no such thing; and as "the common world" must be supposed to understand the language of consciousness as well as the philosopher, we are perfectly willing to leave the decision of that question to the common consciousness of our race. If all men do not believe in a permanent _reality_--a substance which is external to themselves, a substance which offers resistance to their muscular effort, and which produces in them the sensations of solidity, extension, resistance, etc.--they believe nothing and know nothing at all about the matter. [Footnote 239: "Examination of Sir Wm. Hamilton's Philosophy," vol. i. p. 243.]