Christianity and Greek Philosophy: or, the relation between spontaneous and reflective thought in Greece and the positive teaching of Christ and His ApostlesCocker, B. F. (Benjamin Franklin)
Religion
Christianity and Greek Philosophy: or, the relation between spontaneous and reflective thought in Greece and the positive teaching of Christ and His Apostles
Cocker, B. F. (Benjamin Franklin)
Christianity; Church history -- Primitive and early church, ca. 30-600; Philosophy, Ancient
1. "The Law of the Conditioned," as enounced by Hamilton, is
contradictory. It predicates contradiction of two extremes, which are
asserted to be equally incomprehensible and incognizable. If they are
utterly incognizable, how does Hamilton _know_ that they are
contradictory? The mutual _relation_ of two objects is said to be known,
but the objects themselves are absolutely unknown. But how can we know
any relation except by an act of comparison, and how can we compare two
objects so as to affirm their relation, if the objects are absolutely
unknown? "The Infinite is defined as Unconditional Illimitation; the
Absolute as Conditional Limitation. Yet almost in the same breath we are
told that each is utterly inconceivable, each the mere negation of
thought. On the one hand, we are told they _differ_; on the other, we
are told they do _not differ_. Now which does Hamilton mean? If he
insist upon the definitions as yielding a ground of conceivable
difference, he must abandon the inconceivability; but if he insist upon
the inconceivability, he must abandon the definition as sheer verbiage,
devoid of all conceivable meaning. There is no possible escape from this
dilemma. Further, two negations can never contradict; for contradiction
is the asserting and the denying of the same proposition; two denials
can not conflict. If Illimitation is negative, Limitation, its
contradictory, is positive, whether conditional or unconditional. In
brief, if the Infinite and Absolute are wholly incomprehensible, they
are not distinguishable; but if they are distinguishable, they are not
wholly incomprehensible. If they are indistinguishable, they are to us
identical; and identity precludes contradiction. But if they are
distinguishable, distinction is made by difference, which involves
positive cognition; hence one, at least, must be conceivable. It
follows, therefore, by inexorable logic, that either the contradiction
or the inconceivability must be abandoned."[353]
[Footnote 353: North American Review, October, 1864, pp. 407, 408.]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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