It will at once be apparent to the intelligent reader that the direct and natural result of both these theories[504] of knowledge was a tendency to universal skepticism. A spirit of utter indifference to truth and righteousness was the prevailing spirit of Athenian society. That spirit is strikingly exhibited in the speech of Callicles, "the shrewd man of the world," in "Gorgias" (§85, 86). Is this new to our ears?" My dear Socrates, you talk of _law_. Now the laws, in my judgment, are just the work of the weakest and most numerous; in framing them they never thought but of themselves and their own interests; they never approve or censure except in reference to _this._ Hence it is that the cant arises that tyranny is improper and unjust, and to struggle for eminence, guilt. Unable to rise themselves, of course they would wish to preach liberty and equality. But nature proclaims the law of the stronger.... We surround our children from their infancy with preposterous prejudices about liberty and justice. The man of sense tramples on such impositions, and shows what Nature's justice is.... I confess, Socrates, philosophy is a highly amusing study--in moderation, and for boys. But protracted too long, it becomes a perfect plague. Your philosopher is a complete novice in the life _comme il faut_.... I like very well to see a child babble and stammer; there is even a grace about it when it becomes his age. But to see a man continue the prattle of the child, is absurd. Just so with your philosophy." The consequence of this prevalent spirit of universal skepticism was a general laxity of morals. The Aleibiades, of the "_Symposium_," is the ideal representative of the young aristocracy of Athens. Such was the condition of society generally, and such the degeneracy of even the Government itself, that Plato impressively declares "that God alone could save the young men of his age from ruin."[505] [Footnote 504: Between these two extreme theories there were offered two, apparently less extravagant, accounts of the nature and limits of human knowledge--one declaring that "_Science_(real knowledge) _consists in right opinion_" (δόξα ἀληθής), but having no further basis in the reason of man ("Theæstetus," § 108); and the other affirming that "_Science is right opinion with logical explication or definition_" (μετὰ λόχου), ("Theætetus," § 139). A close examination will, however, convince us that these are but modifications of the sensational theory. The latter forcibly remind us of the system of Locke, who adds "reflection" to "sensation," but still maintains that all on "simple ideas" are obtained from without, and that these are the only material upon which reflection can be exercised. Thus the human mind has no criterion of truth within itself, no elements of knowledge which are connatural and inborn.] [Footnote 505: "Republic," bk. vi. ch. vii.]