| | the Deity."[534] |[Footnote 533: "Philebus," § 67] | [Footnote 534: Phædrus, | | § 62.] ____________|_________________________________|____________________________ The foregoing diagram, borrowed from Whewell, with some modifications and additions we have ventured to make, exhibits a perfect view of the Platonic scheme of the _cognitive powers_--the faculties by which the mind attains to different degrees of knowledge, "having more or less certainty, as their objects have more or less truth."[535] 1st. SENSATION (αἴσθησις).--This term is employed by Plato to denote the passive mental states or affections which are produced within us by external objects through the medium of the vital organization, and also the cognition or vital perception or consciousness[536] which the mind has of these mental states. 2d. PHANTASY (φαντασία).--This term is employed to describe the power which the mind possesses of imagining or representing whatever has once been the object of sensation. This may be done involuntarily as "in dreams, disease, and hallucination,"[537] or voluntarily, as in reminiscence. Φαντάσματα are the images, the life-pictures (ζωγράφημα) of sensible things which are present to the mind, even when no external object is present to the sense. [Footnote 535: "Republic," bk. vii. ch. xix.] [Footnote 536: "In Greek philosophy there was no term for 'consciousness' until the decline of philosophy, and in the latter ages of the language. Plato and Aristotle, to say nothing of other philosophers, had no special term to express the knowledge which the mind has of the operation of its own faculties, though this, of course, was necessarily a frequent matter of consideration. Intellect was supposed by them to be cognizant of its own operations.... In his 'Theætetus' Plato accords to sense the power of perceiving that it perceives."--Hamilton's "Metaphysics," vol. i. p. 198 (Eng. ed.).] [Footnote 537: "Theætetus," § 39.]