Christianity in relation to Freethought, Scepticism, and Faith: Three discourses by the Bishop of Peterborough with special replies by Mr. C. BradlaughBradlaugh, Charles
Religion
Christianity in relation to Freethought, Scepticism, and Faith: Three discourses by the Bishop of Peterborough with special replies by Mr. C. Bradlaugh
movements of the comets to the immediate finger of God, and as long
as they believe that an eclipse is one of the modes by which Deity
expresses his anger, they will never be guilty of the blasphemous
presumption of attempting to predict such supernatural appearances.
Before they could dare to investigate the causes of these mysterious
phenomena, it was necessary that they should suspect that the
phenomena themselves were capable of being explained by the human
mind. In the same way until men are content in some degree to bring
their religion before the bar of their own reason, they never can
understand how it is that there should be a diversity of creeds, or
how any one can differ from themselves without being guilty of the
most enormous and unpardonable crime.”
Chillingworth says, “Reason gives us knowledge, while faith only gives us
belief, which is a part of knowledge, and is, therefore, inferior to it.
It is by reason, and not by faith, that we must discriminate in religious
matters, and it is by reason alone that we can distinguish truth from
falsehood.” He solemnly reminds his readers that in religious matters no
one ought to be expected to draw strong conclusions from imperfect
premises, or to credit improbable statements upon scanty evidence; still
less, he says, was it ever intended that men should so prostitute their
reason as to believe with infallible faith that which they are unable to
prove with infallible arguments. The Bishop, agreeing in the utility of
doubt, which he expressed in language nearly as strong as that of Buckle,
says there is one condition without which doubt cannot be useful, and
this condition, being in truth an entire hindrance to doubt, is utterly
unreasonable and impossible. He says the condition on which doubt can be
accepted as useful is that it starts on a certain basis of religious
belief. Now a doubt so based is only a fictitious doubt, a sham doubt, a
hypocritical pretence of doubt. When the Bishop said it was possible to
have a doubt based on belief in the proposition to be doubted, he said
what he could not defend on any platform where reply was permitted. I
feel that in talking of a man in his absence I may be under the
imputation of saying harsh things. The manner in which this debate has
gone on is not one of my fashioning. The Church has taken the pains to
give lectures in the Cathedral where no reply could be offered; but I
promise you that I will endeavour to carry the war into Peterborough, and
see whether the Bishop will attempt an answer under the shadow of his own
cathedral.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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