Christianity in relation to Freethought, Scepticism, and Faith: Three discourses by the Bishop of Peterborough with special replies by Mr. C. BradlaughBradlaugh, Charles
Religion
Christianity in relation to Freethought, Scepticism, and Faith: Three discourses by the Bishop of Peterborough with special replies by Mr. C. Bradlaugh
I have now to complain of something still worse than that the Bishop
should have forgotten his Bible, entirely ignored the Thirty-nine
Articles, and occasionally in the hurry of rapid speech contradicted his
previous sentences. All these are matters at which in even an
extraordinary man burdened with a bishop’s dignity, we need not wonder at
all; but when we find him blundering in metaphysics, when we find him
making mistakes which a man versed in the merest student’s rudiments of
Mill or the Scotch and German metaphysicians, would not make, when we
find the Bishop so blundering, either wilfully or ignorantly, it puts me
in a position of extreme difficulty. He distinguished between the
Sceptic and the Christian, and said the Christian had a faith in
something underlying all phenomena. The Christian’s faith is nothing of
the kind. I will explain my position, and then that of the Christian.
The position of the Naturist is that there is only one existence. I can
only know that existence as conditioned, as phenomenal. What we call
“things” are modes or conditions of existence, known or distinguished
from other conditions by various characteristics or qualities; we only
know substance or existence as conditioned. We only know the phenomenal
or the conditioned. We affirm one existence, and that all we know is
condition of that one existence. But that is not the Christian’s
position. The Christian says there are two existences, the one what he
calls the material universe, and the other the Deity, distinct and
differing in essence, who is the creator of that universe out of nothing,
and who can be the destroyer of it. When the Bishop tried to make these
two opinions into one, he either did not know what he was talking about,
or he supposed that the people to whom he was talking had not the time to
study. The Bishop defined faith as trust or assent, and he declared that
not only in religion but in all other matters we have faith. He said,
for example, and his illustration appeared to me most unfortunately
chosen, that we trusted in our wives, and children, and friends, that it
was possible that our wives might all the time be unfaithful, our
children unloving, and our friends treacherous. These are not the words,
but they give the exact sense of the words. Now I will explain the
difference between religious faith and the ordinary faith. Our ordinary
faith in one another in every-day life is a confidence founded upon our
own experience and the experience of others; and it is because we find
the unfaithful wives are the fewest in number, and the treacherous
friends the fewest in number, that we trust in our wives and our friends.
But religious faith is something entirely different, it is not only not
founded on experience, but it contradicts experience. Religious belief
is the prostration of the intellect; ordinary every-day trust is the
result of the exercise of the intellect. The Bishop spoke of morality.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account