During the whole period of the first three centuries the Church exercised through her bishops this true and proper jurisdiction, both of the exterior and the interior forum. Instances of the former are the punishment of Ananias and Sapphira by St. Peter; of Elymas the sorcerer and the incestuous person at Corinth by St. Paul. But, further, the latter Apostle in his first Epistle to the Corinthians directed that causes of all kinds among Christians should be settled, not before the secular Gentile magistrates, but before the divine magistracy of the Church. And according to this rule the bishops in the first ages took cognisance of all causes and temporal differences, as well of clergy as of laity, and terminated them by their judgment; and this custom lasted even into the fourth century, after the peace of the Church, so that the most troublesome occupation which the bishops of those ages had was to exercise this judicial power over secular matters, as St. Augustine confesses in his own case, where he says, "They demand of us that we should occupy ourselves with their vicious and troublesome covetousness, and give them up our time; at least they press the weak, and force them to bring their causes to us; and we do not venture to say to them, 'Man, who made me a judge or a divider among you?' For the Apostle instituted ecclesiastical judges in such causes by prohibiting Christians from pleading before secular tribunals."[126] Jurisdiction is defined to be "cognition of causes belonging to the magistrate by right of his office."[127] Such a cognition was exercised by the bishops over every sort of cause among Christians in the first centuries. Aristotle says, "Those are most properly to be called magistrates whose function it is to deliberate, to judge, and to command, but especially the latter, as being more characteristic of them." And when St. Paul writes, "Obey those that are set over you, and be subject to them; for they watch as those who will give account of your souls," he says the same, since by the force of relative terms there cannot be the duty of obedience on one side without the right to command on the other. This episcopal magistracy was executed in four degrees, corresponding to the hierarchy and the councils as they have been just described. First, in his diocese the bishop was the proper judge, as Origen in his answer to Celsus draws a parallel between the bishop with his presbytery in each particular city and the chief magistrate of that city with the council. Secondly, the metropolitan with his council of bishops, so that the apostolical canons enjoin that if a bishop be accused by persons of the faith, worthy of credit, he should be brought and judged before that tribunal.[128] Thirdly, if a metropolitan were accused, the higher tribunal of the Primate and his Episcopal Council would intervene. Fourthly, if a Primate, or one of those afterwards termed Patriarchs,