great opponents of the Constitution argued that, if the individual Americans found the granted _national_ powers of the First Article dangerous to human liberty, the “people” or “conventions” would never get the _constitutional_ opportunity to exercise their ability to withdraw. “You”--the “you” being the individual Americans assembled in one convention--“therefore, by a natural and unavoidable implication, give up your rights to the general government.... If you give up these powers,” the enumerated powers of the First Article, “without a bill of rights, you will exhibit the most absurd thing to mankind that ever the world saw--a government that has abandoned all its powers--the powers of direct taxation, the sword, and the purse. You have disposed of them to Congress, without a bill of rights--without check, limitation, or control. And still you have checks and guards; still you keep barriers--pointed where? Pointed against your weakened, prostrated, enervated state government! You have a bill of rights to defend you against the state government, which is bereaved of all power, and yet you have none against Congress, though in full and exclusive possession of all power! You arm yourselves against the weak and defenseless,” the state legislatures mentioned in the Fifth Article, “and expose yourselves naked to the armed and powerful. Is not this a conduct of unexampled absurdity?” So thundered Henry in the Virginia convention. (3 _Ell. Deb._ 446.) “To encourage us to adopt it, they tell us that there is a plain, easy way of getting amendments. When I come to contemplate this part, I suppose that I am mad, or that my countrymen are so. The way to amendment is, in my conception, shut. Let us consider this plain, easy way.” Then follows the verbatim statement of the Madison Fifth Article as proposed from Philadelphia. “Hence it appears that three fourths of the states must ultimately agree to any amendments that may be necessary. Let us consider the consequence of this. However uncharitable it may appear, yet I must tell my opinion--that the most unworthy characters may get into power and prevent the introduction of amendments. Let us suppose--for the case is supposable, possible, and probable--that you happen to deal those powers to unworthy hands; will they relinquish powers already in their possession, or agree to amendments? Two thirds of the Congress, or of the state legislatures, are necessary even to propose amendments.... To suppose that so large a number as three fourths of the states will concur is to suppose that they will possess genius, intelligence, and integrity, approaching to miraculous. It would indeed be miraculous that they should concur in the same amendments, or even in such as would bear some likeness to one another; for four of the smallest states, that do not collectively contain one tenth part of the population of the United States, may obstruct the most salutary and necessary amendments. Nay, in these four