Having their vital and accurate knowledge of the difference between _federal_ and _national_ Articles, that only the latter kind exercises or grants power to interfere with individual human freedom, we recognize at once why the state legislatures are also mentioned in the Fifth Article, although they never can make _national_ Articles. We know it is because those “legislatures,” as the Tenth Amendment expressly declares, retain their existing ability to make _federal_ Articles or Articles which neither exercise nor grant power to interfere with individual freedom. And, sitting in those “conventions,” where Hamilton also sits, we recall his remarkable prophecy, just made to us in _The Federalist_, as we were about to enter the “conventions” with the other Americans therein. “For my own part, I acknowledge a thorough conviction that any amendments which may, upon mature consideration, be thought useful, will be applicable to the organization of the government, _not to the mass of its powers_.” (_Fed._ No. 85.) In that absolutely accurate advance knowledge of the complete history of constitutional amendment from 1789 to 1917, we recognize the motive which prompted Madison _and Hamilton_, on September 10, 1787, to add the mention of those legislative governments to the Fifth Article mention of the _exclusive_ ability of the people or “conventions” to make all future Articles which _do_ relate to the “mass of its powers” to interfere with individual freedom conferred upon the one government of America. We understand that these legislative governments are mentioned in the Fifth Article, which we are now reading in the “conventions” of old, because those “legislatures” have an existing ability to make _federal_ Articles which relate to other things than the _national_ power of government to interfere with individual freedom. Having thus satisfied ourselves, in those conventions, that we ourselves, the “people” of America, _are_ mentioned in the Fifth Article as the sole makers of any future Article which exercises or grants power to interfere with our individual freedom, we turn with interest to the procedure which the Article establishes as the only _constitutional_ mode of procedure in which that exclusive ability of our own may hereafter be evoked to exercise and be exercised. From the language of the Article itself, we know at once that it is simply the statement of a mode of procedure in which our own unlimited ability or the limited ability of the state legislatures, when the occasion seems to arise for the respective exercise of either ability, are hereafter to be evoked by some body of men, playing the part which the Philadelphia Convention has just played in evoking our own exclusive ability, the ability of the “people” or “conventions.”