When the _American people_ created a _national_ legislature, with certain enumerated powers, it was neither necessary nor proper to define the powers retained by the states. These powers proceed, not from the people of America, _but from the people of the several states_; and remain, after the adoption of the Constitution, what they were before, except so far as they may be abridged by that instrument. (Marshall, in the Supreme Court, Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 _Wheat._ 122.) We average Americans know _and will remember_ the clear distinction, the _substantial_ distinction, recognized by the great jurist, between “the people of America” and “the people of the several states,” although they happen to be the same human beings acting in different capacities, as members of different political societies of men. It is a matter of constant mention in the Supreme Court that we ourselves, in addition to our capacity as human beings, have two other distinct capacities, that of citizen of America and that of citizen of our respective state; that, as citizens of America, we alone validly give to _its_ government any power to command us, and, as citizens of our particular state, we alone validly give to _its_ government all its national power to command us. The decisions of the Supreme Court, in that respect, are mentioned elsewhere herein. Meanwhile, we average Americans understand these matters perfectly _and will not forget them_. We are quite accustomed, while retaining our status as free human beings, to be members of many different societies of men and, as the members of some particular society, to give to its government certain powers to interfere with our freedom.