Civilization and ethics : $b The philosophy of civilization, part 2Schweitzer, Albert
Philosophy
Civilization and ethics : $b The philosophy of civilization, part 2
Schweitzer, Albert
Civilization -- History; Ethics
The strength of utilitarianism lies in its simplicity. Bentham and
Adam Smith still show this quality. They have society in their minds
as the sum of a number of individuals, not as an organized body. Their
efforts are directed to inducing human beings to do as much good as
they can to each other.
With John Stuart Mill this simplicity disappears. To him, and then in
still stronger measure to Spencer and others, it occurs that the ethic
of the conduct of an individual to his fellows cannot be carried
through as a matter of reasoning. Hence, they conclude, “scientific
ethics” has to do only with the relations between individuals and
organized society as such.
Bentham’s simple utilitarianism puts before the individual an estimate
of the manifold ways in which society needs his devotion if it is to
see all its members prosperous, and appeals to his enthusiasm. The
utilitarianism which has become biological and sociological tries to
reckon up for the individual the correct balance between egoism and
devotion. It pretends to be social-science transformed to sentiment.
Adam Smith keeps ethics and sociology still apart in such a way that
he is not a sociologist when he speaks as a moralist, and not a
moralist when he puts forward sociological theories. Now, however, the
two points of view are worked in together, and indeed in such a way
that ethics are merged in sociology.
The ethic of the simple utilitarianism is concerned with actions
produced by enthusiasm, the biologico-sociological ethic with the
conscientious employment of the complicated [pg 157] machinery of
organized society. In the former an occasional piece of ineffective
action means at worst a waste of power, in the latter a disturbance of
the organism. Hence thorough-going utilitarianism comes to a
depreciatory estimate of the ethic of the individual which springs
from ethical convictions in the individual and does not think
biologically and sociologically.
That in the sphere of individual ethics there are no more discoveries
to make, passes with the later utilitarians for admitted. They regard
them as an uninteresting hinterland, to advance into which is not
worth while. They therefore confine themselves to the fertile coast
land of social ethics. They see, no doubt, that the streams which
water this lower ground come from the hinterland of individual ethics.
But instead of following them up to their sources their only care is
to make the lower ground safe from occasional inundations which may be
caused by them. They therefore lead the streams into such deep-lying
channels that the land gets parched.
Scientific ethics undertakes the impossible, viz. to regulate devotion
from outside. It tries to drive water-mills without any head of water,
and to shoot with a bow which is but half-bent.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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