Civilization and ethics : $b The philosophy of civilization, part 2Schweitzer, Albert
Philosophy
Civilization and ethics : $b The philosophy of civilization, part 2
Schweitzer, Albert
Civilization -- History; Ethics
Schopenhauer’s world-view, like that of the Brahmans, because it
reveals itself as consistent world- and life-denial, is in the last
resort not ethical but supra-ethical. Even though through several
chapters of his ethics he can speak in more elemental fashion than
Spinoza, Fichte, Schleiermacher, and Hegel, he is nevertheless in
reality no more ethical than they are. He ends, as they do, in the
frozen sea of the supra-ethical point of view, only at the South Pole
instead of at the North. The price which he pays for being able to
outbid them in elemental ethics is his world view of world- and
life-denial. But the price is a ruinous one.
With Schopenhauer, as with the Indians, ethics are only a phase of
world- and life-denial. They are nothing in themselves but merely what
they are in the frame provided by that world-view. And everywhere
there peeps through his ethically tinted world- and life-denial world-
and life-denial as such. Like a strange sun in the sky it devours
ethics, just as the real sun devours a cloud from which men are vainly
hoping to get a refreshing shower of rain.
On the assumption of world- and life-denial all ethical action is
illusory. Schopenhauer’s pity is merely deliberative. Of pity which
brings help he can have no real knowledge any more than the Indian
thinkers can. Like all will-to-action in the world, such pity has no
meaning. It has no power to lighten the misery of the rest of
creation, since that misery lies in the will-to-live, which is
incurably full of suffering. The one thing, therefore, that pity can
do is to enlighten the will-to-live everywhere about the delusion in
which it is held captive, and bring it to the apathy and peace offered
by world- and life-denial. Schopenhauer’s pity, like that of the
Brahmans and the [pg 172] Buddha, is at bottom merely theoretical. It
can use as its own the words of the religion of love, but it stands at
a far lower level than the latter. Obstructing the way to any real
ethic of love it has before it, as the Indian thinkers also have, the
ideal of absolute inactivity.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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