Civilization and ethics : $b The philosophy of civilization, part 2Schweitzer, Albert
Philosophy
Civilization and ethics : $b The philosophy of civilization, part 2
Schweitzer, Albert
Civilization -- History; Ethics
But why go on with this want of candour? Why keep knowledge in
subservience to the will by means of a kind of infamous secret police?
Any world-view deduced therefrom must ever be a poor weak thing. Let
us allow the will and knowledge to come together in a relation which
is honourable to both.
In what has hitherto been called world-view there are two things
united: view of the world and life-view. So long as it was possible to
cherish the illusion that the two were harmonious and each completed
the other, there was nothing to be said against this combination. Now,
however, when the divergence can no longer be concealed, the wider
conception of world-view which includes life-view organically within
itself, must be given up. It is no longer permissible to go on naïvely
believing that we get our life-view [pg 211] from our view of the
world, or furtively elevating in some way or other our life-view into
a view of the world. We are standing at a turning-point of thought.
Critical action which clears away all prevailing _naïvetés_ and
dishonesties has become necessary. We must make up our minds to leave
life-view and view of the world mutually independent of each other,
and see that a straightforward understanding between the two is
reached. We have to admit that because our life-view is made up of
convictions which are given in our will-to-live but are not confirmed
by knowledge of the world, we have allowed it to go beyond the varied
knowledge which makes up our view of the world.
This renunciation of world-view in the old sense, that is of a unitary
world-view which is complete in itself, means a painful experience for
our thought. We come hereby to a dualism against which we at every
moment instinctively rebel. But we must surrender to facts. Our will
to live has to accommodate itself to the inconceivable fact that it is
unable with its own valuable convictions to discover itself again in
the manifold will-to-live which is seen manifested in the world. We
wanted to form a life-view for ourselves out of items of knowledge
gathered from the world. But it is our destiny to live by means of
convictions which an inward necessity makes a part of our thought.
In the old rationalism reason undertook to investigate the world. In
the new it has to take as its task the attaining to clarity about the
will-to-live. Thus we return to an elemental philosophising which is
once more busied with questions of world- and life-view as they
directly affect men, and seeks to give a safe foundation to, and to
keep alive, the valuable ideas which we find in ourselves. It is in a
life-view which is dependent on itself alone, and has come in a
straightforward way to an understanding with world-knowledge, that we
hope to find once more power to attain to ethical world- and
life-affirmation.
[pg 212]
CHAPTER XVIII
THE FOUNDATIONS OF OPTIMISM SECURED FROM THE WILL-TO-LIVE
The pessimistic result of knowledge
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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