Civilization and ethics : $b The philosophy of civilization, part 2Schweitzer, Albert
Philosophy
Civilization and ethics : $b The philosophy of civilization, part 2
Schweitzer, Albert
Civilization -- History; Ethics
As a matter of fact everything which in the ordinary ethical valuation
of the relations of men to each other ranks as good, can be brought
under the description of material and spiritual maintenance or
promotion of human life, and of effort to bring it to its highest
value. Conversely, everything which ranks as bad in human relations is
in the last analysis material or spiritual destruction or obstruction
of human life, and negligence in the effort to bring it to its highest
value. Separate individual categories of good and evil which lie far
apart and have apparently no connexion at all with one another fit
together like things which belong to each other, as soon as they are
comprehended and deepened in this the most universal definition of
good and evil.
The basic principle of the moral means, however, not only an ordering
and deepening of the current views of good and evil, but also a
widening of them. A man is truly ethical only when he obeys the
compulsion to help all life which he is able to assist, and shrinks
from injuring anything that lives. He does not ask how far this or
that life deserves one’s interest as being valuable, nor, beyond that,
whether and how far it can appreciate such interest. Life as such is
sacred to him. He tears no leaf from a tree, plucks no flower, and
takes care to crush no insect. If in summer he is working by
lamplight, he prefers to keep the window shut and breathe a stuffy
atmosphere rather than see one insect after another fall with singed
wings upon his table.
If he goes into the street after a shower and sees an earthworm which
has strayed on to it, he bethinks himself that it must get dried up in
the sun, if it does not get back soon enough to ground into which it
can burrow, and so he lifts it from the deadly stone surface, and puts
it on the grass. If he comes across an insect which has fallen into a
puddle, he stops a moment in order to hold out a leaf or a stalk on
which it can save itself.
He is not afraid of being laughed at as sentimental. It is the fate of
every truth to be a subject for laughter until [pg 248] it is
generally recognized. Once it was considered folly to assume that men
of colour were really men and ought to be treated as such, but the
folly has become an accepted truth. To-day it is thought to be going
too far to declare that constant regard for everything that lives,
down to the lowest manifestations of life, is a demand made by
rational ethics. The time is coming, however, when people will be
astonished that mankind needed so long a time to learn to regard
thoughtless injury to life as incompatible with ethics.
Ethics are responsibility without limit towards all that lives.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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