Civilization and ethics : $b The philosophy of civilization, part 2Schweitzer, Albert
Philosophy
Civilization and ethics : $b The philosophy of civilization, part 2
Schweitzer, Albert
Civilization -- History; Ethics
Why do I forgive anyone? Ordinary ethics say, because I feel sympathy
with him. They allow men to seem to themselves, when they pardon
others, frightfully good, and allow them to practise a style of
pardoning which is not free from humiliation of the other. They thus
make forgiveness a sweetened triumph of self-devotion.
The ethic of reverence for life does away with this unpurified view.
All acts of forbearance and of pardon are for it acts forced from one
by veracity towards oneself. I must practise unlimited forgiveness
because, if I did not, I should be wanting in veracity to myself, for
it would be acting as if I myself were not guilty in the same way as
the other has been guilty towards me. Because my life is so liberally
spotted with falsehood, I must forgive falsehood which has been
practised upon me; because I myself have been in so many cases wanting
in love, and guilty of hatred, slander, deceit, or arrogance, I must
pardon any want of love, and all hatred, slander, deceit, or arrogance
which have been directed against myself. I must forgive quietly and
without drawing attention to it; in fact I do not really pardon at
all, for I do not let things develop to any such act of judgement. Nor
is this any eccentric proceeding; [pg 253] it is only a necessary
widening and refinement of ordinary ethics.
The struggle against the evil that is in mankind we have to carry on
not by judging others, but by judging ourselves. Struggle with oneself
and veracity towards oneself are the means by which we work upon
others. We quietly draw them into our efforts after the deep spiritual
self-assertion which springs out of reverence for one’s own life.
Power makes no noise. It is there, and works. True ethics begin where
the use of language ceases.
The innermost element then, in activist ethics, even if it appears as
self-devotion, comes from the compulsion to veracity towards oneself,
and obtains therein its true value. The whole ethic of being other
than the world flows pure only when it comes from this source. It is
not from kindness to others that I am tender-hearted, peaceable,
forbearing, and friendly, but because by such behaviour I prove my own
deepest self-assertion to be true. Reverence for life which I apply to
my own existence, and reverence for life which keeps me in a temper of
devotion to other existence than mine, interpenetrate each other.
Ethics and thoughtlessness. Ethics and self-assertion
Ordinary ethics, because they are without any basic principle of the
ethical, are obliged to engage at once in the discussion of
conflicting duties. The ethic of reverence for life has no such need
for hurry. It takes its own time to think out in all directions its
own principle of the moral. Knowing itself to be firmly established,
it then settles its position with regard to these conflicts.
It has to come to terms with three adversaries: these are
thoughtlessness, egoistic self-assertion, and society.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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