Civilization and ethics : $b The philosophy of civilization, part 2Schweitzer, Albert
Philosophy
Civilization and ethics : $b The philosophy of civilization, part 2
Schweitzer, Albert
Civilization -- History; Ethics
“But there are many actions which, though useful to the community,
legislation may not command. There are even many injurious actions
which it may not forbid, although moral philosophy does so.
Legislation is, in a word, a circle with the same centre as moral
philosophy, but its circumference is smaller.”
When law ceases to be available, there is nothing that society can do
except be continually putting before the individual personally how
greatly he contributes to his own welfare by furthering that of
others. Bentham does not make it do this with educative guile as does
Helvetius. Society appeals to his feeling for truth. It throws itself
at his feet and entreats him for the sake of the general welfare to
listen to the voice of reason. Thus the dry way in which Bentham
writes about ethics has in it something peculiarly impressive, and
explains the powerful influence which this [pg 079] eccentric member
of the House which looks across the Park at Westminster has exercised
all over the world through the individuals who were inspired by him.
The most influential parts of his work are those in which he
intensifies the seriousness of men and sharpens their outlook by
leading them to reflect not only on the immediate but also on the more
distant consequences of anything done or left undone, and, further,
not only on the material consequences but on the spiritual ones. It
does one good to note the courage with which this fanatic for utility
ventures to represent material blessings as the foundation of
spiritual ones.
Bentham is one of the most powerful moralists who have ever appeared
in the world, but his mistakes are as great as his insight. The latter
is shown in this, that he conceives morality as a kind of enthusiasm.
His mistake is that he thinks he must guarantee the rightness of this
enthusiasm by making it nothing higher than a judgement of society
which is taken over by the individual.
This compels us to rank Bentham with Hobbes, Locke, and Helvetius,
although in other respects he stands high above them. He, like them,
makes morality arise outside the individual. He, like them, in order
to find his explanation of the altruistic, puts out of action the
ethical personality which is in man, and, to compensate for this,
raises society to an ethical personality that he may then by a
transmission of energy connect individuals with this central
power-station. The difference is only that with the other commonplace
moralists the individual is a marionette directed by society on
ethical principles, whereas in Bentham he carries out with deep
conviction the movements suggested to him.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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