Civilization and ethics : $b The philosophy of civilization, part 2Schweitzer, Albert
Philosophy
Civilization and ethics : $b The philosophy of civilization, part 2
Schweitzer, Albert
Civilization -- History; Ethics
His chief work—published after his death, because he could not venture
to publish it himself—he entitles _Ethics_. The [pg 117] title is
confusing, because the nature-philosophy in it is developed almost as
completely as the ethics. It is only when the reader has shaken
himself free of all naïve conceptions in his thought about the
universe that he can be permitted, according to Spinoza, to begin upon
ethics. The fact that ethics too are broken up into precepts which are
given as proved is very prejudicial to their exposition.
In his attempt to found ethics upon nature-philosophy, Spinoza
proceeds as follows. Everything that exists, he says, is given in that
infinite Being, which may be called either God or Nature. For us, and
to us, it presents itself in two forms: as thought (spirit) and as
corporeity (matter). Within this divine nature everything, human
activity included, is determined by necessity. There is no such thing
as doing, there are only happenings. The meaning of human life,
therefore, cannot consist in action, but only in coming to an ever
clearer understanding of man’s relation to the universe. Man becomes
happy when besides belonging to the universe naturally, he also
surrenders himself to it consciously and willingly, and loses himself
spiritually within it.
Spinoza demands therefore a higher experience of life. With the Stoics
and the thinkers of India and China, he belongs to the great family of
the monistic and pantheistic nature-philosophers. Like them, he
conceives of God merely as the sum-total of nature, and accepts as
valid only the notion of God which makes him in this way an
independent unity. The attempts, made in the interests of the ethical
world-view, to allow God to be at the same time an ethical personality
standing outside the universe, are to him an offence against thought.
Their only object is, of course, to obtain with the help of a
confessed or unconfessed dualism a starting-point for an
optimistic-ethical world-view. They are striving to reach along
naïve-religious by-roads the goal for which the rationalistic
optimistic-ethical interpretation of the universe is making along the
direct, but not less naïve, main-road.
[pg 118]
The tragic result of monistic thinking in the Stoic, the Indian, and
the Chinese philosophies is that nature-philosophy, when consistent,
arrives only at resignation, not at ethics. Has Spinoza escaped this
fate?
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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