ON PERFECT AND IMPERFECT MINDS. We are now prepared to inquire in regard to what constitutes _a perfect mind_. This question relates, in the first place, to the perfect constitutional organization of mind, and, in the next place, to the perfect action of mind. In regard to a finite mind, when we inquire as to its perfection in organization, we are necessarily restricted to the question of the object or end for which it is made. Any contrivance in mind or matter is perfect when it is so formed that, _if worked according to its design_, it completely fulfills the end for which it is made, so that there is no way in which it could be improved. It is here claimed, then, that by the light of reason alone we first gain the object for which mind is made, and then arrive at the conclusion that the mind of man is perfect in construction, because, if worked according to its design, it would completely fulfill the end for which it is made, so that there is no conceivable way in which it could be improved. This position can not be controverted except by presenting evidence that some other organization of the mind would produce, in an eternal and infinite system, more good with less evil than the present one. In regard to the Eternal Mind, the only standard of perfection in organization that we can conceive of is revealed in our own mind. Every thing in our own minds--every thing around us--every thing we have known in past experience, is designed to produce the most possible happiness with the least possible evil. We can not conceive of any being as wise, or just, or good, but as he acts to promote that end. A mind organized like our own, with faculties infinitely enlarged, who always has and always will sustain a controlling purpose to act right, is the only idea we can have of an all-perfect Creator. But on the subject of the perfect action of finite minds it is perceived that reference must always be had to _voluntary power_ and its limitations. We have shown that the implanted susceptibility, called the _sense of justice_, demands that the rewards and penalties for good and evil have reference to _the knowledge and power_ of a voluntary agent; that is to say, it is contrary to our moral nature voluntarily to inflict penalties for wrong action on a being who either has no power to know what right is, or no power to do it. We revolt from such inflictions with instinctive abhorrence, as unfit and contrary to the design of all things. So, in forming our judgment of the Creator, when we regard him as perfectly just, the idea implies that he will never _voluntarily_ inflict evil for wrong action on beings who have not the knowledge or power to act right. Here we are again forced to the assumption of some _eternal nature of things_ independent of the Creator's will, by which ignorant and helpless creatures are exposed to suffering from wrong action when they have no power of _any_ kind to act right.