President McKinley threw into the war all his personal experience as a soldier, all his energy as a statesman, and all the power and influence of his administration, which last he had so deliberately and happily conducted as to leave it and the country free from the charge of seeking war in a hasty spirit and through selfish aims. It was an unsought war, one rendered necessary only after every honorable means to avert it had been exhausted, one whose existence was justified by every humanitarian principle. But it was nevertheless one to be fought in earnest and to the nation’s glory. So it was fought. The country and Congress reposed the utmost confidence in the President. He had acted wisely in every preliminary step. He had disarmed fear of intervention by foreign powers. Congress voted him fifty millions of dollars to meet preliminary and extraordinary expenses, and on April 23 he called for 125,000 volunteers. The complement was quickly filled, and on May 25 he called for 75,000 additional men. The response was immediate. Transports were provided for the invasion of Cuba, the navy was strengthened by additional ships and Commodore Dewey, in command of the naval squadron at Hongkong was ordered to strike the Spaniards at Manila, and on May 1 occurred the great battle there which resulted in the destruction of the Spanish fleet, and the events that followed to give to the United States the group of islands, known as the Philippines that are so opulent in resource as to be of great commercial value, as well as strategic. These events are matters of history familiar to all readers, or readily available in the records of the war. Thus from April 19, when a state of war was recognized, to August 12, when the protocol was signed, within a period of 115 days, the United States had swept from Spain her island possessions in both the West and East Indies, destroyed her effective fleets and humbled her in the eyes of nations. Victory was as complete as the war had been brief and brilliant. Congress and the country had stood by the administration as it had stood by them. As executive of the nation and Commander-in-Chief of its forces, President McKinley had achieved for his country a new place among the powers, and his directing hand was more than ever needed to guide her through the intricate paths of responsibility entailed by signal victory. And, let it be remembered in this connection, that the multitudinous problems of conquest were of a kind wholly within his keeping until Congress could act upon them. As head of the military he alone was responsible for that provisional rule of ceded territory which its holding, its peace, or its disposition under treaty terms required.