Congressional government : $b a study in American politicsWilson, Woodrow
History
Congressional government : $b a study in American politics
Wilson, Woodrow
Executive power -- United States; United States -- Politics and government; United States. Congress
It should, however, be accounted a deduction from the Senate's
usefulness that it is seldom sure of more than two thirds of itself for
more than four years at a time. In order that its life may be perpetual,
one third of its membership is renewed or changed every two years, each
third taking its turn at change or renewal in regular succession; and
this device has, of course, an appreciably weakening effect on the
legislative sinews of the Senate. Because the Senate mixes the parties
in the composition of its Committees just as the House does, and those
Committees must, consequently, be subjected to modification whenever the
biennial senatorial elections bring in new men, freshly promoted from
the House or from gubernatorial chairs. Places must be found for them at
once in the working organization which busies itself in the
committee-rooms. Six years is not the term of the Senate, but only of
each Senator. Reckoning from any year in which one third of the Senate
is elected, the term of the majority,--the two thirds not affected by
the election,--is an average of the four and the two years which it has
to live. There is never a time at which two thirds of the Senate have
more than four years of appointed service before them. And this constant
liability to change must, of course, materially affect the policy of the
body. The time assured it in which to carry out any enterprise of policy
upon which it may embark is seldom more than two years, the term of the
House. It may be checked no less effectually than the lower House by the
biennial elections, albeit the changes brought about in its membership
are effected, not directly by the people, but indirectly and more
slowly by the mediate operation of public opinion through the
legislatures of the States.
In estimating the value of the Senate, therefore, as a branch of the
national legislature, we should offset the committee organization, with
its denial of leadership which disintegrates the Senate, and that
liability to the biennial infusion of new elements which may at any time
interrupt the policy and break the purpose of the Senate, against those
habits of free and open debate which clear its mind, and to some extent
the mind of the public, with regard to the nation's business, doing much
towards making legislation definite and consistent, and against those
great additions to its efficiency which spring from its observation of
"slow and steady forms" of procedure, from the mediate election which
gives it independence, and from its having a rational and august cause
for existing.
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